Prometheus and Mega Lists, April 1999 (Part Seven)
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 1999 22:16:14 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: megalist@brokersys.com
Subject: Re: [MegaList] Foghorn
Well, folks. There's the proof. That's why they call him "Foghorn". If he
doesn't get his way right up front, he'll torture you until he does. Many
times has he basked in unholy triumph as his victims dragged themselves
up to him on their bloody knees, hand clasped in supplication, pleading
"Stop! Stop! God, I'll do *anything*! Just make it *stop*!"
Since some members have requested that reprints be kept to a minimum, I'll
wing it on this one. I'd love to respond to Kevin's jibes and snappy
rejoinders one by one, but I don't want to let him filibuster anyone out
of the discussion. This time at least, I don't want to see him get away.
1. Kevin Langdon is not an officer of the Mega Society, or even the
"editor of Noesis". For the explanation, please see the document posted at
http://www.angelfire.com/ms/mega/ByWay.html. It's all there - how the
same chunk of real estate was sold twice to two different people (first
me and then Cole), how Kevin was only the second "volunteer" for the
position of editor (of Chris Cole's newsletter), and so on.
2. The set of correlations of the LAIT and other power-IEQ tests with
actual reputable IQ tests looks, on the basis of what most of us have
seen, to be lower than one could expect of any respectable IQ test (and
no, Kevin, you don't get to figure travel time into the duration of real
IQ tests). For a short list of correlations, see Darryl Miyaguchi's site
at http://www.eskimo.com/~miyaguch.
3. The Mega Society IS about the intellectual productions of its qualified
members, not about rustling up guinea pigs for the psychometric research
(and everlasting glory) of merely honorary members like Kevin Langdon,
whose highest registered score on an IQ test is, as I recall, 158. He
doesn't even qualify for Prometheus.
4. Neither Kevin Langdon nor Bob Dick has ever come up with a single error
or conceptual inadequacy on the part of any contribution by me. They just
like to *pretend* they have. Watch how Kevin squirms to avoid admitting
this when I start in on him over Steve's topic. And Kevin - which of those
3 CTMU principles (as in Noesis/ECE 139, and "3" as in 1,2,3,...) didn't
you understand? I'm right here at your service, Foghorn.
5. A "spike" is the metal spike (wouldn't you know it?) on an editor's
desk. When he wants to kill a contributor's article, he impales it on the
spike ("spikes it"). Kevin has threatened on many occasions to spike
people's articles, usually efter pronouncing everything they write "Crap!"
(perhaps his favorite epithet). We can't know for sure that Kevin has
*really* spiked anyone's work; as soon as he threatened me, for instance,
I began putting out another edition of Noesis (the real one). All we can
say for sure is that he has discouraged meaningful contributions from
members, especially those who disagree with him (i.e., rational ones).
6. Kevin wants to hide. He wants to hide from me regarding a lot of
problems I solved, whose solutions he pronounced "Crap!" And he also wants
to hide from the legal establishment by suppressing any chance the Mega
Society might have to be widely recognized. He knows he can't defend his
work against the kind of scrutiny that would then befall it.
7. Kevin has the subtlety of wit and sarcasm of, as Jacqueline Suzanne
might have put it, a "truckdriver in drag". So forgive me if I sometimes
trample it beneath my uncaring feet.
8. Kevin has made money - plenty of money - off the HIQ community. What he
did with it is not for me to say. But the thousands of scoring fees, the
journal subscription fees, and as I recall, even the official stipends he
has received must add up to something. And let's not forget the element of
speculation. As long as he maintains his precarious toehold here, he can
hope for an eventual windfall. Unfortunately, he'll force the rest of us
into obscurity as soon as he's ready to hog the limelight (which, as
should be clear, he currently feels too weak to do, theoretically and
legally speaking).
Okay, time for a break.
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 1999 01:04:50 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: megalist@brokersys.com
Subject: Re: [MegaList] Reply to Chris Langan, 4/6/99 (Part Th
Sorry for the reprints, but Kevin Langdon contrived to sandwich the meaty
philosophical topic Steve introduced between extraneous messages. I take
the opportunity to respond to certain points throughout. But what everyone
should make sure to read is the part about rationalism versus empiricism
in science, which Kevin has already begun to muddy up. In fact, he's
already made two major errors (and we're talking major). If anyone doesn't
understand any part of it, please say so. When I get Kevin against the
wall this time, I don't want his supporters boiling out of the woodwork
with their usual cries of incomprehensibility.
> >>>> The SAT isn't an IQ test; it's a test of crystallized
> >>>> intelligence.
>
> >> and
>
> >>>> Most other IQ tests are indeed normed using childhood
> >>>> scores, and these scores have been incorporated in the
> >>>> power-IEQ test normings. The baby's already in the bath
> >>>> water that Kevin wants to throw out. He can't do this
> >>>> without experimental statistical gyrations that would curl
> >>>> the lip of any mainstream psychometrician.
>
> >> The SAT is considered a thinly-veiled and pretty good IQ
> >> test (at least for U. S. High School juniors and seniors -
> >> - it isn't "culture-fair"). A number of references
> >> regarding this fact can be found in the Prometheus Society
> >> Membership Committee report.
>
> > I have that report. Quoting Jensen, it reads "Data obtained
> > from 339 college students support the notion that much of the
> > variance in SAT scores can be attributed to g." Obviously,
> > this isn't the same as calling it an "IQ test".
>
> What's the difference?
IQ tests are designed primarily to measure *g*. The SAT was designed as
an "achievement test". That means that *g* is being filtered through a
crystalline sieve of learned information. If one lacks the learning to
understand the questions fully, one never gets down to *g* on this test.
So at best, the SAT is a "contaminated IQ test". So is the LAIT and every
other test you've ever designed. But with you, the main contaminating
factor is persistence...and in an indeterminate number of cases, collusion.
> > For the report then goes on "There are cautionary notes to
> > be added, though: g-loading is a function of both the test
> > involved and the population being measured. Jensen's data
> > were obtained from a small sample of college students..."
> > It even mentions a study in the Princeton Review which
> > claims that SAT-takers can register improvements of well
> > over 200 points due to coaching.
>
> The best SAT prep courses do seem to be able to achieve that
> much of a difference, though most courses don't come near
> that. 200 points of total SAT score is about 20 points of IQ,
> which is decidedly nontrivial. Part of ETS' strategy all along
> has been to pooh-pooh SAT preparation books and courses--
> and it's worked. Only a small percentage of those who take
> the SAT use anything of the sort to prepare.
>
> I don't doubt that the SAT has a significant crystallized *g*
> component. It is likely that that is why these programs are
> successful. However, no one is claiming that this component
> doesn't exist, only that the *g* loading of the SAT is not
> inferior to that of most IQ tests.
>
> > I have no trouble acknowledging that the SAT is g-loaded.
> > But it's loaded for other factors too, and we can't be sure that
> > these other factors don't play a part in the correlations with
> > power-IEQ tests.
>
> My tests correlate better with "fluid" than with "crystallized"
> intelligence tests.
>
> > Moreover, what about the persistence factor? I know for a
> > fact that power-IEQ test scores are pretty sensitive to how
> > much time you're willing to spend racking them up. The
> > Mega Society selects its members well above the level at
> > which persistence enters the picture. I know that from
> > personal experience, as well as from the reports of other
> > members. Why do you think Ron Hoeflin felt compelled to
> > disallow second attempts? There was too much gain for
> > extra time spent. Persistence is not equivalent to *g*.
>
> What is left out here is the amount of time it actually takes to
> take a conventional IQ test. First one must make arrangements
> to be tested, then one must drive to the test site, take the test,
> and drive home. When you add a comfort factor to total time
> spent, there's no obvious advantage to the more traditional
> tests.
Come off of it. IQ tests are defined on constraints on the time spent
addressing their items, not time on the Expressway. The lack of time
constraints on power IEQ tests constitutes a huge a priori difference
between the two kinds of test. The burden is thus on you to prove
they're measuring the same thing. But with the amount of scatter you're
dealing with, you can't achieve the strong correlations to do that.
Until we achieve a mechanical explanation of intelligence, *g* will remain
a statistical construct defined on tests incorporating time constraints.
But statistics only yield a shadow of the underlying deterministic factor
structure of any given device relative to human cognition. Your tests
lack time constraints; there's no "speed factor". So you have to explain
why the time metafactor drops out, and you need more than statistical
inference to do it. There's no reason to suppose that the statistics are
casting an image of identical logical constructs, especially when power
IEQ tests correlate poorly with so many IQ tests.
> On Tue, 6 Apr 1999, James C. Harbeck rote:
> >> In a way, it's fun to watch the sLANGing match whiz by; it
> >> saves me from having to turn on pro wrestling on TV to get
> >> roughly the same.
>
> Sure, if you disregard the intellectual content. A lot of people
> seem to feel that intellecual issues needn't be dealt with if they
> are accompanied by strong feelings. This is wrong.
>
> >> And I even get the pleasure of hitting the D button and
> >> making whole reams of invective disappear magically as
> >> though down a wide-mouthed toilet. But could I make one
> >> small request? When replying to each other, could you keep
> >> the repeat (i.e., caretted) material down to a minimum? And
> >> avoid saying the same thing too many times? My mailbox got
> >> maxed out over the weekend, resulting in several bounces,
> >> and even just since yesterday it's come dangerously close to
> >> overflowing again. Brevity, amigos, is the soul of wit, no?
> >> And if you were to keep your missives to two screens in
> >> length, more people might take the time to read them
> >> through--if that matters to you (if it doesn't, and you're happy
> >> having a three- or four-way shouting match, perhaps you
> >> could take it off the list to save bandwidth).
> >> Muchos gracias, James Harbeck.
>
> > I agree, big Jim. I'd rather discuss something with real content
> > (that's what those challenges Kevin keeps ignoring are about -
> > actual mathematico-philosophical issues we've debated).
>
> So what's stopping you? You don't need my permission to post
> material on whatever interests you.
Get ready, Foghorn.
> > Let's go back to the latest topic proposed by Steve: the distinction
> > between rationalistic and empirical factors in theorization.
>
> > Here's what I say. I say both factors are necessary.
>
> Aristotle and Kant both said something like that. How do your
> views resemble and differ from theirs?
Aristotle's ideas are hopelessly antiquated here, so (although we note
that his theory of universals ascribes a degree of reality to logical
potential), we have to move up to Kant. Kant failed to posit the proper
degree of isomorphism between conceptual and noumenal reality. This led
him to conclude that we could "never know" deep reality. To some extent he
was right, but not to the extent he supposed.
>
> > Modern science is attempting to have its cake and eat it too by
> > booting rational cognition out of the picture while making free
> > use of logic and mathematics to relate observed phenomena
> > (and even to construct experiments).
>
> Modern science gives rational cognition an honored place, but
> not the same central place as direct observation of the world.
Nonsense. Modern science still makes a sharp distinction between objective
reality - what's "out there" - and cognitive reality, or what's "in
here", when one is in fact unavoidably distributed over the other.
>
> > I say that's a paradox...a prima facie absurdity constituting a
> > protracted backlash against (Grecophile) scholasticism. You
> > can't boot cognitive structure out of objective reality in order
> > to "de-subjectivize" it and then use it to glue together your
> > supposedly "objective" theories.
>
> Science doesn't claim any "objective" theories. A real scientist
> considers all conclusions to be tentative, to varying degrees.
> Cognitive processing of data is necessary to draw precise and
> systematic conclusions. This is analogous to the sharp images
> obtained through computer processing of raw image data
> returned by interplanetary spacecraft. It doesn't mean that the
> data is inherently digital.
Yes, science does indeed claim objectivity for its theories. It does this
by forcing them to address "objective phenomena" exclusively. For example,
the theories of a mathematician contain no model of the mathematician
himself; since physical theories utilize mathematics in this form, the
exclusion is transitive. You're confusing non-objectivity with any
subunary degree of confirmation. The concept of objectivity, which is
defined by juxtaposition to subjectivity, is independent of degree
of confirmation relative to a given axiomatization of a theory. [This is
your first really bad mistake.]
By the way, information processing can be analog or digital.
> > The very idea is ridiculous, but has been swallowed hook,
> > line and sinker by much of the scientific establishment. Call
> > it "anti-scholastic scholasticism".
>
> You don't suppose that scholasticism itself could be to blame
> for its bad reputation?
The spirit of institutional scholasticism survives in the modern
university system, which is still in a reactionary mode relative to its
own history. Most scientists belong to academia. So your question
translates as "you don't suppose that scientists themselves could be to
blame (for the problems with their viewpoint)?" They are indeed
responsible, for they let their secular-humanistic seminaries
tell them how to think.
>
> > For example, the metric tensor, a mathematical construct, is
> > accepted as a feature of spacetime structure (we can use any
> > other mathematical ingredient of physical law just as easily).
> > That amounts to the physical objectivization of a certain
> > mathematical construct. But since a tensor is just a
> > mathematical black box that transforms input vectors to
> > output vectors (or scalars), this amounts to saying that
> > spacetime is computational - or in a specific generalized
> > sense, "cognitive" - in nature and functionability. This is
> > totally out of sync with modern science, which would scream
> > like a wounded eagle at the very idea that reality works by
> > means of distributed generalized cognition. Why, it's almost
> > a projection of the human psyche onto "objective reality"!
>
> A model is a model. The real world is the real world. The map
> is not the territory.
We're talking about mappings or correspondences, not the kind of "maps"
you tack up on your study wall. A model is the embodiment of a theory in
the universe of discourse of that theory. In the case of a scientific
theory, that's the real world. To be precise, a model of a class of
formulae is any interpretation (or mapping) under which all of the
formulae are true in the syntactic and semantical senses. This mapping can
be thought of as a set of connections between a theory T and its universe
U(T). The mapping M:T<-->U(T) cannot be depicted without both sets of
endpoints, one of which (U(T)) inhabits the real world. That's why a
computational model of a physical process has to run in a physical
computer. [This is your second really bad mistake.]
> > Remember, Kant identified logic and mathematics as what
> > amount to "elements of cognitive syntax". So when you
> > implant them in objective reality, you implant the cognitive
> > syntax of the human mind in reality. And when you do that,
> > you (in effect) make reality cognitive.
>
> There are aspects of human awareness of the world that are
> not cognitive. We share these aspects with other animals. And
> the use of cognitive categories in dealing with the world does
> not require "implanting" anything. One simply looks for
> patterns, then makes use of cognitive processing to construct
> experiments to test the resulting hypotheses. The hypotheses
> are treated hypothetically until they've been verified.
You're placing unspecified semantical constraints on "cognitive"...
constraints you may have found in Webster's dictionary. In logic (and
logically-pursued science), terms remain open to definition, and we deal
with semantic relations among logical structures. The relation between
cognition and that which is cognited is all that counts in this kind of
discussion. Since the relation in question turns out to be invariant with
respect to certain generalizations of its relands, we're not limited by
Webster's. Instead, we can consider intuitive or instinctual or
subconscious forms of information transduction in addition to rational
ones. But that's not really the issue here.
Here's the issue. The correspondence between the patterns you perceive and
the object of perception itself is an isomorphism. In other words, science
constrains reality up to isomorphism with perceived patterns; a theory
selects that part of the real world amenable to these constraints and
therefore isomorphic to cognition. Science has been progressing toward a
theory - one overall formalism - that "selects" the entire universe this
way, excluding nothing. But in the sense that it will be valid only up to
isomorphism with cognition, cognition and reality are equivalent.
> > So why do physicists, and even mathematicians, so
> > assiduously screen all mention of cognition out of their
> > theoretical universes? Are they dummies? Or are they just
> > frightened?
>
> Or are they just aware of all the nonempirical nonsense that
> comes from the mouths and keyboards of "philosophers"
> who think that you can make something out of nothing.
Better watch out, Kevin. You've already been set up for a bit of a
"spanking" here. When I talk about the implications of the isomorphism I
just explained, I'm talking big, big, big. And if you keep on running your
mouth to the contrary, your brain will look small, small, small...even
smaller than it already does to some of us. After all, I've been trying to
get your attention regarding these points for the last decade. Now let's
start living up to that "Great Generalist" routine of yours before I make
it look even more ridiculous than I already have.
Of course, in keeping with your evident opinion that logic equals outer
space and being illogical means keeping your feet on the ground, maybe
I've just blasted off into outer space. So I hereby ask everyone on this
list: do you understand what has been said so far?
I repeat: do you understand what's been said so far?
> On Tue, 6 Apr 199914:28:46 -0400 (EDT), Chris wrote:
> >Subject: Re: [MegaList] Some thoughts on sanity
>
> > On Tue, 6 Apr 1999, Don O'Brien wrote:
>
> >> It seems to me that anyone claiming superiority by virtue
> >> of never having had mental difficulties is like an artist
> >> claiming to be an expert in shades of gray who has never
> >> seen or experienced black.
>
> Yes, but not everyone who's seen black has fallen into the
> clutches of the mental health system.
>
> >> I will not be so presumptuous as to assume that I am in
> >> any way superior by having experienced black myself.
> >> However, when I can put aside my own fear, it is an
> >> interesting and enlightening experience to have gone
> >> through; shedding a minuscule amount of light on how
> >> much of "me" is just a particular combination of
> >> chemicals in my brain.
>
> Yes. It's at the same time terrifying and very interesting
> when one sees through some of the machinery that hides
> people's condition from themselves and catch a glimpse of
> the fragmentation, automaticity, and comforting illusions
> making up the psychic life of man.
>
> Is there something in me that *isn't* jsut a particular
> combination of chemicals?
And you call yourself a philosopher?
>
> >> I could argue that one might more objectively evaluate,
> >> comprehend and appreciate sanity by having something to
> >> compare it with in personal experience.
> >>
> >> Personally I have found that the ignorance and prejudice
> >> of others is more of a discouragement than the disease itself.
> >> Except that it would give more credit for experience than
> >> is due, I would say that denigrating someone for mental
> >> problems is itself a form of insanity.
>
> > You're quite correct. I apologize for seeming to suggest that
> > people with mental problems are "inferior". I don't really
> > believe this, and I'm sure the rest of us don't either. I was
> > just angered when Bob Dick suggested as much regarding
> > me, even though he's been on the dark side himself. Try to
> > remember that Bob has a history of disparaging me and my
> > work without giving any rationally-accessible specifics. I'm
> > tired of it, not least because his accusations are so frequently
> > echoed by his pal Foghorn...again, without benefit of
> > meaningful specifics. It's a game they play.
>
> Forget about old grievances. Look how much energy it takes
> just to deal with current ones. I'm willing to debate with you
> but I'm not willing to dig up old stuff at your command.
Then stop bringing it up. Every time you make a statement like "everybody
in Mega already knows that Chris is a crank", you're bringing up your own
past unsubstantiated accusations. Now put up or shut up.
>
> > Let me ask you this. Would you rather that I patronize Bob
> > because I know that he's had mental difficulties? Or would
> > you rather that I treat him just like I treat Kevin? [If you'd
> > rather that I ignore them both and let Kevin have his way the
> > customary 100% of the time at Society expense, you can
> > forget it.]
>
> I was not aware that the Mega Society marched to my tune.
But you *have* called it a "marching band", haven't you.
>
> I take being Editor as a form of public service. Anyone who
> feels that I am in any way oppressing him or her is welcome
> to bring this to my attention.
I feel you're oppressing me, Foghorn.
Chris
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 1999 14:48:42 -0700
To: megalist@brokersys.com
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [MegaList] Reply to Chris Langan, 4/7/99
To provide reflief to others on this list, I have gone back to
snipping passages not commented on and thread-ends where I
am content to let Chris have the last word.
At 01:04 AM 4/7/99 -0400, Chris Langan wrote:
[Quoting Guy Fogleman:]
>>>> The SAT is considered a thinly-veiled and pretty good IQ
>>>> test (at least for U. S. High School juniors and seniors -
>>>> - it isn't "culture-fair"). A number of references
>>>> regarding this fact can be found in the Prometheus Society
>>>> Membership Committee report.
>>> I have that report. Quoting Jensen, it reads "Data obtained
>>> from 339 college students support the notion that much of the
>>> variance in SAT scores can be attributed to g." Obviously,
>>> this isn't the same as calling it an "IQ test".
[Quoting me:]
>> What's the difference?
> IQ tests are designed primarily to measure *g*. The SAT was
> designed as an "achievement test".
The "A" in "SAT" stands for *aptitude*. ETS admiinsters
separate tests of achievement along with the SAT. But Chris is
right in the sense that it's an aptitude test contaminated with
elements of "achievement."
> That means that *g* is being filtered through a crystalline
> sieve of learned information. If one lacks the learning to
> understand the questions fully, one never gets down to *g*
> on this test.
Yes, but the required level of learning is very low. Only about
the top third of high-school seniors take the SAT.
> So at best, the SAT is a "contaminated IQ test". So is the LAIT
> and every other test you've ever designed. But with you, the
> main contaminating factor is persistence...and in an
> indeterminate number of cases, collusion.
While persistence is an important factor for tests like mine and
Ron Hoeflin's, they're still highly *g* loaded. Collusion is
always a possibility with these tests, but there's no evidence
that it's widespread.
<snip>
>>> Moreover, what about the persistence factor? I know for a
>>> fact that power-IEQ test scores are pretty sensitive to how
>>> much time you're willing to spend racking them up. The
>>> Mega Society selects its members well above the level at
>>> which persistence enters the picture. I know that from
>>> personal experience, as well as from the reports of other
>>> members. Why do you think Ron Hoeflin felt compelled to
>>> disallow second attempts? There was too much gain for
>>> extra time spent. Persistence is not equivalent to *g*.
>> What is left out here is the amount of time it actually takes to
>> take a conventional IQ test. First one must make arrangements
>> to be tested, then one must drive to the test site, take the test,
>> and drive home. When you add a comfort factor to total time
>> spent, there's no obvious advantage to the more traditional
>> tests.
> Come off of it. IQ tests are defined on constraints on the time
> spent addressing their items, not time on the Expressway.
That's relevant to the conditions under which the tests are taken
but not to the deterrent value of having to take a large block of
time away from other interests, which is what makes the
persistence factor problematic.
> The lack of time constraints on power IEQ tests constitutes a
> huge a priori difference between the two kinds of test. The
> burden is thus on you to prove they're measuring the same
> thing. But with the amount of scatter you're dealing with, you
> can't achieve the strong correlations to do that.
The burden's already been met. A robust *g* factor emerges
from the LAIT and the Mega. The LAIT correlates well with a
number of other tests, as my statistical reports make clear.
> Until we achieve a mechanical explanation of intelligence,
> *g* will remain a statistical construct defined on tests
> incorporating time constraints.
According to Jensen, tests with severe time constraints have
no significant *g* loading.
> But statistics only yield a shadow of the underlying
> deterministic factor structure of any given device relative
> to human cognition. Your tests lack time constraints; there's
> no "speed factor". So you have to explain why the time
> metafactor drops out, and you need more than statistical
> inference to do it.
Say what? Talk English, Crhis.
> There's no reason to suppose that the statistics are casting
> an image of identical logical constructs, especially when
> power IEQ tests correlate poorly with so many IQ tests.
The correlations aren't great, but the high-range power tests
appear to bite off at least as big a chunk of *g* as most of
the standard tests.
<snip>
>>> Modern science is attempting to have its cake and eat it too by
>>> booting rational cognition out of the picture while making free
>>> use of logic and mathematics to relate observed phenomena
>>> (and even to construct experiments).
>> Modern science gives rational cognition an honored place, but
>> not the same central place as direct observation of the world.
> Nonsense. Modern science still makes a sharp distinction between
> objective reality - what's "out there" - and cognitive reality, or
> what's "in here",
Yes, it does. But I didn't say it didn't.
> when one is in fact unavoidably distributed over the other.
...which remains to be demonstrated.
>>> I say that's a paradox...a prima facie absurdity constituting a
>>> protracted backlash against (Grecophile) scholasticism. You
>>> can't boot cognitive structure out of objective reality in order
>>> to "de-subjectivize" it and then use it to glue together your
>>> supposedly "objective" theories.
>> Science doesn't claim any "objective" theories. A real scientist
>> considers all conclusions to be tentative, to varying degrees.
>> Cognitive processing of data is necessary to draw precise and
>> systematic conclusions. This is analogous to the sharp images
>> obtained through computer processing of raw image data
>> returned by interplanetary spacecraft. It doesn't mean that the
>> data is inherently digital.
> Yes, science does indeed claim objectivity for its theories. It
> does this by forcing them to address "objective phenomena"
> exclusively. For example, the theories of a mathematician
> contain no model of the mathematician himself; since physical
> theories utilize mathematics in this form, the exclusion is
> transitive.
I agree that scientific theories do not generally include models
of the theoreticians themselves.
> You're confusing non-objectivity with any subunary degree
> of confirmation. The concept of objectivity, which is
> defined by juxtaposition to subjectivity, is independent of
> degree of confirmation relative to a given axiomatization of
> a theory. [This is your first really bad mistake.]
Presumably, you are speaking of, e.g., certain mathematical
propositions which are analytically true. You seem to be
further asserting that there are such propositions regarding
the physical world, but you have not established this to my
satisfaction.
> By the way, information processing can be analog or digital.
Of course it can. But I was deliberately using digital/analog *as
an analogy* to cognitive/observational--and NASA's photographic
enhancement is definitely done digitally, to digitally-created
spacecraft images.
<snip>
>> > For example, the metric tensor, a mathematical construct, is
>> > accepted as a feature of spacetime structure (we can use any
>> > other mathematical ingredient of physical law just as easily).
>> > That amounts to the physical objectivization of a certain
>> > mathematical construct. But since a tensor is just a
>> > mathematical black box that transforms input vectors to
>> > output vectors (or scalars), this amounts to saying that
>> > spacetime is computational - or in a specific generalized
>> > sense, "cognitive" - in nature and functionability. This is
>> > totally out of sync with modern science, which would scream
>> > like a wounded eagle at the very idea that reality works by
>> > means of distributed generalized cognition. Why, it's almost
>> > a projection of the human psyche onto "objective reality"!
>> A model is a model. The real world is the real world. The map
>> is not the territory.
> We're talking about mappings or correspondences, not the kind
> of "maps" you tack up on your study wall.
Yes. That was clear already.
> A model is the embodiment of a theory in the universe of
> discourse of that theory. In the case of a scientific theory, that's
> the real world. To be precise, a model of a class of formulae is
> any interpretation (or mapping) under which all of the
> formulae are true in the syntactic and semantical senses. This
> mapping can be thought of as a set of connections between a
> theory T and its universe U(T). The mapping M:T<-->U(T)
> cannot be depicted without both sets of endpoints, one of which
> (U(T)) inhabits the real world. That's why a computational model
> of a physical process has to run in a physical computer. [This is
> your second really bad mistake.]
Einstein = mc^2 --e
You continue to maintain that there's some kind of identity between
the map and the territory. Nothing you have written has established
this.
>>> Remember, Kant identified logic and mathematics as what
>>> amount to "elements of cognitive syntax". So when you
>>> implant them in objective reality, you implant the cognitive
>>> syntax of the human mind in reality. And when you do that,
>>> you (in effect) make reality cognitive.
>> There are aspects of human awareness of the world that are
>> not cognitive. We share these aspects with other animals. And
>> the use of cognitive categories in dealing with the world does
>> not require "implanting" anything. One simply looks for
>> patterns, then makes use of cognitive processing to construct
>> experiments to test the resulting hypotheses. The hypotheses
>> are treated hypothetically until they've been verified.
> You're placing unspecified semantical constraints on "cognitive"
> ...constraints you may have found in Webster's dictionary.
I am not relying on Webster. Thoughts, feelings, and sensations
are psychic phenomena of very different types, phenomenologically,
not definitionally. If you want to define the latter two as "cognitive,"
you're departing from standard usage, so you need to define your
terms.
> In logic (and logically-pursued science), terms remain open to
> definition, and we deal with semantic relations among logical
> structures. The relation between cognition and that which is
> cognited is all that counts in this kind of discussion. Since the
> relation in question turns out to be invariant with respect to
> certain generalizations of its relands, we're not limited by
> Webster's. Instead, we can consider intuitive or instinctual or
> subconscious forms of information transduction in addition to
> rational ones. But that's not really the issue here.
> Here's the issue. The correspondence between the patterns you
> perceive and the object of perception itself is an isomorphism.
> In other words, science constrains reality up to isomorphism
> with perceived patterns; a theory selects that part of the real
> world amenable to these constraints and therefore isomorphic
> to cognition. Science has been progressing toward a theory -
> one overall formalism - that "selects" the entire universe this
> way, excluding nothing. But in the sense that it will be valid
> only up to isomorphism with cognition, cognition and reality
> are equivalent.
That's the issue, all right. And you haven't proven your case.
>>> So why do physicists, and even mathematicians, so assiduously
>>> screen all mention of cognition out of their theoretical universes?
>>> Are they dummies? Or are they just frightened?
>> Or are they just aware of all the nonempirical nonsense that
>> comes from the mouths and keyboards of "philosophers"
>> who think that you can make something out of nothing.
> Better watch out, Kevin. You've already been set up for a bit of a
> "spanking" here. When I talk about the implications of the
> isomorphism I just explained, I'm talking big, big, big.
Yes, yes, yes.
> And if you keep on running your mouth to the contrary, your
> brain will look small, small, small...even smaller than it already
> does to some of us.
I'm scared, scared, scared.
> After all, I've been trying to get your attention regarding these
> points for the last decade. Now let's start living up to that "Great
> Generalist" routine of yours before I make it look even more
> ridiculous than I already have.
You have certainly made *someone* look ridiculous.
> Of course, in keeping with your evident opinion that logic
> equals outer space and being illogical means keeping your feet
> on the ground,
Bob Dick said something like that on this list recently, but it isn't
my position.
> maybe I've just blasted off into outer space. So I hereby ask
> everyone on this list: do you understand what has been said
> so far?
> I repeat: do you understand what's been said so far?
I'd be interested in that, too.
<snip>
>> Forget about old grievances. Look how much energy it takes
>> just to deal with current ones. I'm willing to debate with you
>> but I'm not willing to dig up old stuff at your command.
> Then stop bringing it up. Every time you make a statement like
> "everybody in Mega already knows that Chris is a crank", you're
> bringing up your own past unsubstantiated accusations. Now put
> up or shut up.
If you want to dig that old shit up and bore everybody on this
list with it, go ahead, but I will only respond to what you say in
the present exchange; I won't do your research for you.
<snip>
>> I take being Editor as a form of public service. Anyone who
>> feels that I am in any way oppressing him or her is welcome
>> to bring this to my attention.
> I feel you're oppressing me, Foghorn.
And just how might I be doing that? By rejecting material you
haven't submitted to *Noesis*? By usurping your rightful
place as Editor? Or maybe by not acknowledging your divinity?
Kevin Langdon
Date: Wed, 07 Apr 1999 22:48:27 -0500
To: megalist@brokersys.com
From: Steve Schuessler <bahai@brokersys.com>
Subject: [MegaList] understand what's been said so far?
[Chris Langan writes:]
>Of course, in keeping with your evident opinion
>that logic equals outer space and being illogical means
>keeping your feet on the ground, maybe I've just blasted
>off into outer space. So I hereby ask everyone on this
>list: do you understand what has been said so far?
>I repeat: do you understand what's been said so far?
Yes, I understand this--although I've not necessarily accepted that 'perceptual patterns'
is isomorphic with cognition.
I could use a bit more clarity regarding the term perception (or the phrase perceptual patterns). If the more encompassing 'Perception', as the concept, is meant, I can unfold my semantic space to that shape (although for me that would mean cognition is truth, hence binding the relation of truth and reality). Otherwise, who (or what) may be doing the perceiving-- here's where only an omniscient operator would be able to perfectly equate its perception with its cognition, and I'd be back to square one--Aristotle with the logical potential only.
To put it another way, which generalizations of the relation turn out to be invariant
is not yet specified, so I am not able to project.
Kevin- on semantic specification:
The arbitrary Red Queen is a philosopher, although one doomed to annihilation in the mephitic lava of contradiction. However, when Kant proffers 'analytic vs. synthetic a priori propositions', to me he is making a philosophical claim involving a concept, and I'm bringing my space suit.