Prometheus and Mega Lists, April 1999 (Part Nine)

Date: Fri, 9 Apr 1999 11:12:39 -0700
To: megalist@brokersys.com
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [MegaList] Reply to Chris Langan, 4/9/99 (Part Two)

(Continued from Part One)

[Phase 2]

>>>>> I say that's a paradox...a prima facie absurdity constituting a
>>>>> protracted backlash against (Grecophile) scholasticism. You
>>>>> can't boot cognitive structure out of objective reality in order
>>>>> to "de-subjectivize" it and then use it to glue together your
>>>>> supposedly "objective" theories.

>>>> Science doesn't claim any "objective" theories. A real scientist
>>>> considers all conclusions to be tentative, to varying degrees.
>>>> Cognitive processing of data is necessary to draw precise and
>>>> systematic conclusions. This is analogous to the sharp images
>>>> obtained through computer processing of raw image data
>>>> returned by interplanetary spacecraft. It doesn't mean that the
>>>> data is inherently digital.

>>> Yes, science does indeed claim objectivity for its theories. It
>>> does this by forcing them to address "objective phenomena"
>>> exclusively. For example, the theories of a mathematician
>>> contain no model of the mathematician himself; since physical
>>> theories utilize mathematics in this form, the exclusion is
>>> transitive.

>> I agree that scientific theories do not generally include models
>> of the theoreticians themselves.

> And that's what makes them objective. The mental processes of
> the theorist are deliberately excluded from scientific theories.
> When you denied that such theories were objective for that reason,
> you were wrong.

That certainly doesn't make them objective. When a pro wrestler is
trash talking about how he's gonna put his opponent in the hospital,
his model of the situation doesn't include the mental processes of
the wrestler himself, but it would not be in accordance with standard
usage to describe his statements as "objective."

> What you meant was that scientific theories lack *absolute
> certainty* due to the impossibility of perfect empirical confirmation
> in an inductive context relative to a given set of axioms, theorems
> and postulates. In other words, you don't properly understand the
> meaning of "objectivity".

What you meant is that I don't use the term the same way you do.

[Phase 1]

>>> You're confusing non-objectivity with any subunary degree
>>> of confirmation. The concept of objectivity, which is
>>> defined by juxtaposition to subjectivity, is independent of
>>> degree of confirmation relative to a given axiomatization of
>>> a theory. [This is your first really bad mistake.]

>> Presumably, you are speaking of, e.g., certain mathematical
>> propositions which are analytically true. You seem to be
>> further asserting that there are such propositions regarding
>> the physical world, but you have not established this to my
>> satisfaction.

> This is the exact opposite of what was actually stated. Analytic
> truth, which boils down to syntactic consistency, is not subject to
> empirical confirmation. Empirical truth, on the other hand, is
> always subject to confirmation. When one observes that empirical
> confirmation is always subunary with respect to open sets, one is
> saying the exact opposite of what you're now implying. Don't try
> to pull any cheap reversals on me here, Kev. You got nailed.

What "reversals"? I'm just trying to figure out what *you* had in
mind, which is not aways easy, since you insist on nonstandard
terminology.

> Everybody knows that scientific theories are designed for
> objectivity (phenomenal focus), and that objectivity can exist
> with any degree of empirical confirmation.

I doubt very much that everyone "knows" that.

[Phase 2]

>>> By the way, information processing can be analog or digital.

>> Of course it can. But I was deliberately using digital/analog
>> *as an analogy* to cognitive/observational--and NASA's
>> photographic enhancement is definitely done digitally, to
>> digitally-created spacecraft images.

> Your analogy is irrelevant. What is relevant is that observation
> is always constrained by cognition. If you have no element of
> mental syntax corresponding to a certain color, then you can't
> observe the color. If phenomenal reality fails to conform to
> your cognitive syntax - or, reverting to Kantian terminology,
> your internal mental categories - at any level of reference, then
> it isn't real. As soon as you perceive its effects, you can conceive
> it as a cause; conversely, if you can't conceive it as a cause, then
> you can't perceive its effects, and it isn't in your reality. In the
> sense that cognitive categories are attributes of phenomenal
> reality, cognition distributes over reality.

So you say, but you haven't established any of this.

[Phase 1]

>>>>> For example, the metric tensor, a mathematical construct,
>>>>> is accepted as a feature of spacetime structure (we can use
>>>>> any other mathematical ingredient of physical law just as
>>>>> easily). That amounts to the physical objectivization of a
>>>>> certain mathematical construct. But since a tensor is just a
>>>>> mathematical black box that transforms input vectors to
>>>>> output vectors (or scalars), this amounts to saying that
>>>>> spacetime is computational - or in a specific generalized
>>>>> sense, "cognitive" - in nature and functionability. This is
>>>>> totally out of sync with modern science, which would s
>>>>> cream like a wounded eagle at the very idea that reality
>>>>> works by means of distributed generalized cognition.
>>>>> Why, it's almost a projection of the human psyche onto
>>>>> "objective reality"!

No "almost" about it.

>>>> A model is a model. The real world is the real world. The
>>>> map is not the territory.

>>> We're talking about mappings or correspondences, not the
>>> kind of "maps" you tack up on your study wall.

>> Yes. That was clear already.

>>> A model is the embodiment of a theory in the universe of
>>> discourse of that theory. In the case of a scientific theory,
>>> that's the real world. To be precise, a model of a class of
>>> formulae is any interpretation (or mapping) under which
>>> all of the formulae are true in the syntactic and semantical
>>> senses. This mapping can be thought of as a set of
>>> connections between a theory T and its universe U(T). The
>>> mapping M:T<-->U(T) cannot be depicted without both sets
>>> of endpoints, one of which (U(T)) inhabits the real world.
>>> That's why a computational model of a physical process has
>>> to run in a physical computer. [This is your second really
>>> bad mistake.]

>> Einstein = mc^2 --e
>>
>> You continue to maintain that there's some kind of identity
>> between the map and the territory. Nothing you have written
>> has established this.

> Are you spacing out on me here? I'm trying to explain what a
> "model" is in the context of advanced logic and formalized
> theories. By definition, according to every scientist on this
> planet, a model is based on an isomorphism, and in fact an
> intersection, between theory and universe. That constitutes
> exactly what you say is missing: an identity relation between
> "map" (which in your lexicon corresponds to theory) and
> "territory" (the real world).

According to *you*, not to "every scientist on the planet." A
scientist *tries* to make his models correspond to the real
world, but most scientists would not agree with what you
wrote about an "identity relation."

> This identity relation is imperfect, but is just what it sounds
> like: an identification of theory and universe. Both are
> present in the model. The imperfection, which equals the
> deficit of empirical confirmation we were just discussing, is
> why scientific theories can evolve to embrace more and more
> of the physical universe.

A given theory can be an advance over existing theory, in the
sense that it corresponds more closely to real phenomena, or
it can be a step in the wrong direction; it can turn out to be
wrong. How is the universe present in a wrong model?

> Heads up, Kevin. The first time around, you displayed an
> ignorance of what scientists and mathematicians mean by
> "model". Now you're refusing to catch on even when the
> definition is served to you on a platter, and flunking out on
> "isomorphism" to boot.

You just don't like it when I don't accept your nonstandard
definitions.

>>>>> Remember, Kant identified logic and mathematics as
>>>>> what amount to "elements of cognitive syntax". So
>>>>> when you implant them in objective reality, you
>>>>> implant the cognitive syntax of the human mind in
>>>>> reality. And when you do that, you (in effect) make
>>>>>reality cognitive.

I haven't noticed reality giving much of a damn.

>>>> There are aspects of human awareness of the world that
>>>> are not cognitive. We share these aspects with other
>>>> animals. And the use of cognitive categories in dealing
>>>> with the world does not require "implanting" anything.
>>>> One simply looks for patterns, then makes use of cognitive
>>>> processing to construct experiments to test the resulting
>>>> hypotheses. The hypotheses are treated hypothetically until
>>>> they've been verified.

>>> You're placing unspecified semantical constraints on
>>> "cognitive" ...constraints you may have found in Webster's
>>> dictionary.

>> I am not relying on Webster. Thoughts, feelings, and
>> sensations are psychic phenomena of very different types,
>> phenomenologically, not definitionally. If you want to define
>> the latter two as "cognitive," you're departing from standard
>> usage, so you need to define your terms.

> I did: generalized cognition equals information transduction.
> According to Kant, thoughts, feelings and sensations - which
> contain information on your mental state and/or relationship to
> the external world - are all transduced into awareness by virtue
> of their correspondence to elements of mental syntax (mental
> categories). Your brain "transduces" them. This is obvious by
> reductio ad absurdum alone: if they are not transduced from the
> environment to your awareness at your mental boundary, then
> you are not aware of them, and they do not exist for you.

It's not obvious and I doubt that it's true.

>>> In logic (and logically-pursued science), terms remain open
>>> to definition, and we deal with semantic relations among
>>> logical structures. The relation between cognition and that
>>> which is cognited is all that counts in this kind of discussion.
>>> Since the relation in question turns out to be invariant with
>>> respect to certain generalizations of its relands, we're not
>>> limited by Webster's. Instead, we can consider intuitive or
>>> instinctual or subconscious forms of information transduction
>>> in addition to rational ones. But that's not really the issue here.
>>>
>>> Here's the issue. The correspondence between the patterns you
>>> perceive and the object of perception itself is an isomorphism.
>>> In other words, science constrains reality up to isomorphism
>>> with perceived patterns; a theory selects that part of the real
>>> world amenable to these constraints and therefore isomorphic
>>> to cognition. Science has been progressing toward a theory -
>>> one overall formalism - that "selects" the entire universe this
>>> way, excluding nothing. But in the sense that it will be valid
>>> only up to isomorphism with cognition, cognition and reality
>>> are equivalent.

>> That's the issue, all right. And you haven't proven your case.

> Now, if I bean somebody over the melon with a stick, and he
> ignores me, I can always say to myself, "Well, he's evidently got
> a really thick, bony skull." But when I'm on the email list of the
> world's most exclusive high-IQ society, explain certain well-
> known mathematical facts, and the person I'm addressing doesn't
> appear to have the foggiest notion of what has been said to him,
> I have to wonder if I've got the right list.

> Maybe you want the proof spelled out more concisely. Here it is
> again, in the plainest possible language:

> 1. Theories are carried into their object universes by (contractible)
> isomorphism (see top paragraph in this message).

Not established.

> 2. The object universes of scientific theories are located in
> objective reality.

Assuming reality is objective (which I happen to think is true).

> 3. By 1 and 2, scientific theories are carried into objective reality
> and assimilated by the causal structure thereof.

True if 1 and 2 are true.

> 4. Theories are mental, conceptual constructs that are cognitive in
> structure and implementation.

Yes.

> 5. By 3 and 4, science distributes cognition over objective reality.

True if 1 and 2 are true.

> [The extent of distribution is virtually always ambiguous with
> regard to any particular scientific theory. But since science
> assumes the ultimate existence of a comprehensive theory, it tacitly
> assumes that cognition is ultimately distributed over reality at large.
> Failure to acknowledge this fact generates scientific paradox.]

Science *hopes* that a grand unified theory is possible. In
mathematics, that turned out not to be the case.

> Of course, you might say something like this: "Isomorphism,
> shmorphism! Nothing whatsoever is reposed in reality; we just
> assume it has causal structure of its own and try to approximate
> that structure using our always-makeshift theories." But then I
> need merely point out that the objective causal structure in
> question has a certain minimal description, and this is just the
> structural intersect of all of these temporary theories: namely,
> information transduction, which we have already equated to
> generalized cognition. More specifically, it is distributed parallel
> computation, which is just what one gets by distributing any
> dynamic theory over any homogeneous local medium. Without
> this, objective causality would lack the means to function, and
> reality would be an unpredictable Langdonoid chaos for ever after.

I am not denying that there are *laws* governing physical and
psychic phenomena. But these laws must be discovered and verified
and this is an *empirical* matter.

> Or you might pull your usual and say, "none of this is
> comprehensible to any rational person!" In that case, all I can say
> is that if this is really utterly incomprehensible to you, Kevin, then
> you really are too damned dumb to be in this group.

Parts of it are comprehensible, and then there are those little "leaps."
That's why nobody can follow it.

> And don't appeal to the chorus, because I thoroughly doubt that
> any rational, qualified member will be willing to share the
> judgment you'll have invited on yourself.

Somehow I doubt that many Mega members are in fear of your
"judgment."

>>>>> So why do physicists, and even mathematicians, so
>>>>> assiduously screen all mention of cognition out of their
>>>>> theoretical universes? Are they dummies? Or are they just
>>>>> frightened?

>>>> Or are they just aware of all the nonempirical nonsense
>>>> that comes from the mouths and keyboards of "philosophers"
>>>> who think that you can make something out of nothing.

>>> Better watch out, Kevin. You've already been set up for a bit
>>> of a "spanking" here. When I talk about the implications of the
>>> isomorphism I just explained, I'm talking big, big, big.

>> Yes, yes, yes.

>>> And if you keep on running your mouth to the contrary, your
>>> brain will look small, small, small...even smaller than it already
>>> does to some of us.

>> I'm scared, scared, scared.

> Why? It never scared you before.

Irony is lost on Chris.

>>> After all, I've been trying to get your attention regarding these
>>> points for the last decade. Now let's start living up to that
>>> "Great Generalist" routine of yours before I make it look even
>>> more ridiculous than I already have.

>> You have certainly made *someone* look ridiculous.

>Yes I have. But it isn't who you still seem to think.

> [To sum it all up, Kevin's position has been rendered absurd
> beyond redemption.

The absurdity of Chris' position needs no "rendering."

> In addition, it has been shown that although he proudly calls
> himself a "generalist" and a "philosopher", he doesn't
> understand the meanings of elementary philosophical terms
> like "objectivity", "model", and "isomorphism"... concepts
> accessible to any high school student with a room-temperature
> IQ.]

I leave it to others to judge whose position makes more sense.

>>>> Forget about old grievances. Look how much energy it
>>>> takes just to deal with current ones. I'm willing to debate
>>>> with you but I'm not willing to dig up old stuff at your
>>>> command.

>>> Then stop bringing it up. Every time you make a statement
>>> like "everybody in Mega already knows that Chris is a
>>> crank", you're bringing up your own past unsubstantiated
>>> accusations. Now put up or shut up.

>> If you want to dig that old shit up and bore everybody on
>> this list with it, go ahead, but I will only respond to what
>> you say in the present exchange; I won't do your research
>> for you.

> Right...of course. I'm the one calling myself a "crank". Sure
> I am.

You don't need to *say* it....

> You're obviously the one who dredges up your bullshit
> accusations, not me. But I wouldn't be too quick to assume
> that solving difficult problems debated by the Society would
> "bore" the people on this list, especially as an alternative to
> being lobotomized by another round of your interminable
> faux-psychometric beancounting.

> Chris Langan

Some on this list have already said that they find it boring.

I'd appreciate it if others would put forward their own views
on Chris' claims.


Kevin Langdon

Date: Sat, 10 Apr 1999 01:11:49 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
Reply-To: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: megalist@brokersys.com
Subject: Re: [MegaList] Reply to Chris Langan, 4/9/99 (Part Two)

[PART 2 OF A 2-PART REPLY]

Gird thy loins, my fellow Megarians, as duty calls us to beat down the
remainder of Kevin Langdon's brutal assault on the lexicon of logic,
philosophy and higher mathematics.

On Fri, 9 Apr 1999, Kevin Langdon wrote:

> (Continued from Part One)
>
> [Phase 2]

> >> I agree that scientific theories do not generally include models
> >> of the theoreticians themselves.
>
> > And that's what makes them objective. The mental processes of
> > the theorist are deliberately excluded from scientific theories.
> > When you denied that such theories were objective for that reason,
> > you were wrong.
>
> That certainly doesn't make them objective. When a pro wrestler is
> trash talking about how he's gonna put his opponent in the hospital,
> his model of the situation doesn't include the mental processes of
> the wrestler himself, but it would not be in accordance with standard
> usage to describe his statements as "objective."

Phenomenal focus is a necessary but insufficient condition for
objectivity (do you understand this distinction?) Trash-talking pro
wrestlers fail the objectivity test for another reason, namely emotional
and dramatic contamination. The "theories" promulgated by these wrestlers
are deliberately infused with dramatic and emotional elements. This is a
separate issue, and it has no bearing on what most of us refer to as
"scientific theories".

> > What you meant was that scientific theories lack *absolute
> > certainty* due to the impossibility of perfect empirical confirmation
> > in an inductive context relative to a given set of axioms, theorems
> > and postulates. In other words, you don't properly understand the
> > meaning of "objectivity".
>
> What you meant is that I don't use the term the same way you do.
>
What I meant was that you don't use it correctly (see above comment).
>
> >>> You're confusing non-objectivity with any subunary degree
> >>> of confirmation. The concept of objectivity, which is
> >>> defined by juxtaposition to subjectivity, is independent of
> >>> degree of confirmation relative to a given axiomatization of
> >>> a theory. [This is your first really bad mistake.]
>
> >> Presumably, you are speaking of, e.g., certain mathematical
> >> propositions which are analytically true. You seem to be
> >> further asserting that there are such propositions regarding
> >> the physical world, but you have not established this to my
> >> satisfaction.
>
> > This is the exact opposite of what was actually stated. Analytic
> > truth, which boils down to syntactic consistency, is not subject to
> > empirical confirmation. Empirical truth, on the other hand, is
> > always subject to confirmation. When one observes that empirical
> > confirmation is always subunary with respect to open sets, one is
> > saying the exact opposite of what you're now implying. Don't try
> > to pull any cheap reversals on me here, Kev. You got nailed.
>
> What "reversals"? I'm just trying to figure out what *you* had in
> mind, which is not aways easy, since you insist on nonstandard
> terminology.

Let's cut to the chase. Who else besides Kevin thinks that I'm using
"nonstandard terminology" in this discussion, given its subject matter?

> > Everybody knows that scientific theories are designed for
> > objectivity (phenomenal focus), and that objectivity can exist
> > with any degree of empirical confirmation.
>
> I doubt very much that everyone "knows" that.
>
Doubt it all you want. But it's the truth, at least with respect to those
calling themselves scientists and philosophers of science.

> > ... What is relevant is that observation
> > is always constrained by cognition. If you have no element of
> > mental syntax corresponding to a certain color, then you can't
> > observe the color. If phenomenal reality fails to conform to
> > your cognitive syntax - or, reverting to Kantian terminology,
> > your internal mental categories - at any level of reference, then
> > it isn't real. As soon as you perceive its effects, you can conceive
> > it as a cause; conversely, if you can't conceive it as a cause, then
> > you can't perceive its effects, and it isn't in your reality. In the
> > sense that cognitive categories are attributes of phenomenal
> > reality, cognition distributes over reality.
>
> So you say, but you haven't established any of this.
>
Kevin, nobody has ever established *anything* for you that you didn't
already believe before they opened their mouths. If anyone on this list
didn't already know this, he or she sure as hell knows it now!
>
> >>>>> For example, the metric tensor, a mathematical construct,
> >>>>> is accepted as a feature of spacetime structure (we can use
> >>>>> any other mathematical ingredient of physical law just as
> >>>>> easily). That amounts to the physical objectivization of a
> >>>>> certain mathematical construct. But since a tensor is just a
> >>>>> mathematical black box that transforms input vectors to
> >>>>> output vectors (or scalars), this amounts to saying that
> >>>>> spacetime is computational - or in a specific generalized
> >>>>> sense, "cognitive" - in nature and functionability. This is
> >>>>> totally out of sync with modern science, which would s
> >>>>> cream like a wounded eagle at the very idea that reality
> >>>>> works by means of distributed generalized cognition.
> >>>>> Why, it's almost a projection of the human psyche onto
> >>>>> "objective reality"!
>
> No "almost" about it.

At last...a glimmering of consciousness.
>
> >>>> A model is a model. The real world is the real world. The
> >>>> map is not the territory.
....
> > Are you spacing out on me here? I'm trying to explain what a
> > "model" is in the context of advanced logic and formalized
> > theories. By definition, according to every scientist on this
> > planet, a model is based on an isomorphism, and in fact an
> > intersection, between theory and universe. That constitutes
> > exactly what you say is missing: an identity relation between
> > "map" (which in your lexicon corresponds to theory) and
> > "territory" (the real world).
>
> According to *you*, not to "every scientist on the planet." A
> scientist *tries* to make his models correspond to the real
> world, but most scientists would not agree with what you
> wrote about an "identity relation."
>
Every scientist on the planet, especially if he knows anything about
logic, defines objectivity, model and isomorphism just like I do. The
other ones, and I say this with all due respect, don't have meaningful
opinions on the matter. But after all, they're not logicians; they're
scientists. So they only have to *do* science, not explain what it is.
>
> A given theory can be an advance over existing theory, in the
> sense that it corresponds more closely to real phenomena, or
> it can be a step in the wrong direction; it can turn out to be
> wrong. How is the universe present in a wrong model?

First, you use "theory" and "model" as synonyms. That's what you might
call a "nonstandard" equation. But to answer your question, we're talking
about functional scientific theories here. And while a specific theory
only corresponds to reality up to some limited degree of confirmation, its
generalized cognitive substrate - e.g. logic and mathematics - corresponds
perfectly to reality in a selective way. That is, they define the
architecture and programming of the parallel distributed processor
providing causality with an objective mechanism.
>
> > Heads up, Kevin. The first time around, you displayed an
> > ignorance of what scientists and mathematicians mean by
> > "model". Now you're refusing to catch on even when the
> > definition is served to you on a platter, and flunking out on
> > "isomorphism" to boot.
>
> You just don't like it when I don't accept your nonstandard
> definitions.

Once again, which "nonstandard definition" are you referring to? There's
only one "nonstandard" thing about this discussion, and that's the
discombobulated semantics of Kevin Foghorn Langdon.
>
> >>>>> Remember, Kant identified logic and mathematics as
> >>>>> what amount to "elements of cognitive syntax". So
> >>>>> when you implant them in objective reality, you
> >>>>> implant the cognitive syntax of the human mind in
> >>>>> reality. And when you do that, you (in effect) make
> >>>>>reality cognitive.
>
> I haven't noticed reality giving much of a damn.

Yeah...a lot of reality seems to pass *you* by.

> > ... generalized cognition equals information transduction.
> > According to Kant, thoughts, feelings and sensations - which
> > contain information on your mental state and/or relationship to
> > the external world - are all transduced into awareness by virtue
> > of their correspondence to elements of mental syntax (mental
> > categories). Your brain "transduces" them. This is obvious by
> > reductio ad absurdum alone: if they are not transduced from the
> > environment to your awareness at your mental boundary, then
> > you are not aware of them, and they do not exist for you.
>
> It's not obvious and I doubt that it's true.

Who cares whether you doubt it at this point? If nothing in the real
universe "acknowledges" something by reacting to it, i.e. by transducing
it as information, then it is without real effect,and from any vantage in
the universe proper, it doesn't exist. If it exists for itself, then
great! But in the absence of a cause-effect linkage, it makes no
difference to anybody or anything in the universe.

> > Maybe you want the proof spelled out more concisely. Here it is
> > again, in the plainest possible language:
>
> > 1. Theories are carried into their object universes by (contractible)
> > isomorphism (see top paragraph in this message).
>
> Not established.

Bullshit. Every predicate in a theory is attributed to the appropriate
object in its object universe. If I have a theory of colored balls, the
first-order predicate "orange ball at coordinates (x,y,z,t)" is carried by
isomorphism to the orange ball at those objective spatial coordinates. In
a similar way, every predicate of the theory is carried into the
corresponding element of the object universe.

I also have a theory of Kevin Langdon. It contains the identifier "Kevin
Langdon". Do you deny that this term coincides with you? (If so, I suggest
you go with "Foghorn"!)

> > 2. The object universes of scientific theories are located in
> > objective reality.
>
> Assuming reality is objective (which I happen to think is true).

That's right - I'm even trying to use your terminology.
>
> > 3. By 1 and 2, scientific theories are carried into objective reality
> > and assimilated by the causal structure thereof.
>
> True if 1 and 2 are true.

And they are, as we have again demonstrated.
>
> > 4. Theories are mental, conceptual constructs that are cognitive in
> > structure and implementation.
>
> Yes.
>
> > 5. By 3 and 4, science distributes cognition over objective reality.
>
> True if 1 and 2 are true.

Glory, Hallelujah! He has seen the light! [Naaahhhh...] But seriously,
Kevin, check out what I wrote with regard to step 1. When, according to
physical theory, we say that the earth has "mass", we mean that the mass
in question literally coincides with the earth. Mass, like physics in
general, is conceptual. So in this case, and in the case of every other
theoretic predication of science, concept coincides with reality. Can't
you see this?
....
> > [The extent of distribution is virtually always ambiguous with
> > regard to any particular scientific theory. But since science
> > assumes the ultimate existence of a comprehensive theory, it tacitly
> > assumes that cognition is ultimately distributed over reality at large.
> > Failure to acknowledge this fact generates scientific paradox.]
>
> Science *hopes* that a grand unified theory is possible. In
> mathematics, that turned out not to be the case.

In a way you're right. But in another way, you're wrong again. Godel's
theorems merely place a minimum level of generality on the formulation of
such a theory (since Godel's theorems can't undermine the logic used to
derive them without becoming self-invalidating, they are inapplicable
above the level of mathematical generality on which they are validated).
The same applies to physics. Logic is King.
....
>
> > Of course, you might say something like this: "Isomorphism,
> > shmorphism! Nothing whatsoever is reposed in reality; we just
> > assume it has causal structure of its own and try to approximate
> > that structure using our always-makeshift theories." But then I
> > need merely point out that the objective causal structure in
> > question has a certain minimal description, and this is just the
> > structural intersect of all of these temporary theories: namely,
> > information transduction, which we have already equated to
> > generalized cognition. More specifically, it is distributed parallel
> > computation, which is just what one gets by distributing any
> > dynamic theory over any homogeneous local medium. Without
> > this, objective causality would lack the means to function, and
> > reality would be an unpredictable Langdonoid chaos for ever after.
>
> I am not denying that there are *laws* governing physical and
> psychic phenomena. But these laws must be discovered and verified
> and this is an *empirical* matter.

Did you, or did you not, just affirm the existence of physical and psychic
laws? Because if you did, then you must have been making a rational
statement, because you don't have the empirical data to identify the laws
in question. This means that you are projecting your rational need for
laws onto "objective reality". You're doing it, Kevin. You're doing it
right now, and out of the other side of your mouth, you're denying that it
can be done!
...
> > Or you might pull your usual and say, "none of this is
> > comprehensible to any rational person!" In that case, all I can say
> > is that if this is really utterly incomprehensible to you, Kevin, then
> > you really are too damned dumb to be in this group.
>
> Parts of it are comprehensible, and then there are those little "leaps."
> That's why nobody can follow it.

There are no leaps. And everyone but you can follow it.
...
> > And don't appeal to the chorus, because I thoroughly doubt that
> > any rational, qualified member will be willing to share the
> > judgment you'll have invited on yourself.
>
> Somehow I doubt that many Mega members are in fear of your
> "judgment."

I wasn't just talking about my judgment. Other members are watching too.
...
> >> I'm scared, scared, scared.
>
> > Why? It never scared you before.
>
> Irony is lost on Chris.

Evidently, it's also lost on *you*.
....
> The absurdity of Chris' position needs no "rendering."

That's because it's mathematical fact, accessible to anyone but a dunce.
....
> > In addition, it has been shown that although he proudly calls
> > himself a "generalist" and a "philosopher", he doesn't
> > understand the meanings of elementary philosophical terms
> > like "objectivity", "model", and "isomorphism"... concepts
> > accessible to any high school student with a room-temperature
> > IQ.]
>
> I leave it to others to judge whose position makes more sense.

Once again, is there anyone here who is willing to stand up and claim
Kevin's position as his or her own?
....
> > You're obviously the one who dredges up your bullshit
> > accusations, not me. But I wouldn't be too quick to assume
> > that solving difficult problems debated by the Society would
> > "bore" the people on this list, especially as an alternative to
> > being lobotomized by another round of your interminable
> > faux-psychometric beancounting.
>
> Some on this list have already said that they find it boring.

It's boring because by repeatedly denying facts, you force their endless
repetition. But I've just about had it with you anyway. You're too damned
dense for me.
>
> I'd appreciate it if others would put forward their own views
> on Chris' claims.

I'd appreciate the same. I have only a limited amount of time to waste on
anyone who doesn't understand what models and isomorphisms are. One Kevin
Langdon in this group is already one too many.

Chris Langan