Prometheus Lists, Febuary 1999

Date: Sun, 14 Feb 1999 15:58:51 -0800
To: Prometheus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Treasurer's Report on Election Results

At 01:49 PM 2/14/99 -0800, Fred Britton wrote:

> Treasurer's Report on the Election

> (To appear in GOF 103)

> The results of the election for officers in Prometheus are as follows:

> Summary of the voting for President:

> There were 40 votes cast for President, 18 votes for Ullen, 10 votes
> for Johnson and 12 votes Schuessler, when all the first place votes
> were counted. There was one vote for Ullen and there were 5 votes
> for Schuessler, when the 6 second choices of Johnson voters were
> reallocated.

> This makes the final tally 18 + 1 = 19 for Ullen, and 12 + 5 = 17 for
> Schuessler.

> Thus, Fredrik Ullen is elected President.

Interesting what a difference preferential voting makes. Ullen was far
ahead in the first tally, but barely won the second.

> Summary of voting for Editor:

> There were 39 votes cast for Editor, 34 votes for Vaughan, 3 write-in
> votes for Langdon, one write-in vote for Ullen, one write-in vote for
> Harbeck.

> Thus, Fred Vaughan is elected Editor.

I carefully avoided campaigning, even to the point of not responding
to an inaccurate characterization of the content of *Noesis* under my
editorship, so this should not be construed as a "mandate" for Fred
Vaughan. Five write-in votes indicates that there are at least some
people who are not happy with Fred's approach.

<snip>

> Comments on the Election:

> There were 40 ballots received. There were no spoiled ballots.

> As near as can be determined, all of those members who actually voted,
> except for one, were informed, either by e-mail, regular mail or phone,
> of the preferential nature of the presidential part of the election.
> However, there were 22 who voted without specifying a 2nd or 3rd
> choice, and only 18 who actually specified 2nd and 3rd choices. Those
> who voted with an X or a check had those marks counted as the numeral
> one.

> The relevant paragraph of the Constitution, ARTICLE X, para. 2, reads
> as follows:

>> When more than two candidates are running for an office, or when
>> more than two alternative proposals covering the same subject matter
>> are voted on simultaneously, a preferential ballot shall be used. If there
>> is not a majority according to first-place votes, the candidate or
>> proposal receiving the fewest first-place votes shall be eliminated, with
>> the ballots indicating this first place choice redistributed according to
>> their second-place choices, etc., until a majority vote emerges. If there
>> is a tie for any office or proposal, it is broken by a vote of the previous
>> officers. The Treasurer shall cast a vote only in case there is a tie vote
>> among the other officers.

It's a good thing we're all smart here. The etc. in the fourth line from the
bottom covers a lot of territory--but despite its complexity the remaining
details of the algorithm are indeed obvious.

> It is not made clear in the above paragraph whether or not members
> voting are *required* to indicate their 2nd and 3rd choices. In fact,
> when I communicated by phone with one member to inform him of
> the preferential voting, he insisted that this was an option rather than
> a requirement, and that he was free to indicate only one choice if he
> so wished.

That's the common-sense interpretation. What is *not* optional is to
inform the members that there will be a preferential voting--but that
was done substantively by Fred Britton in this case.

> Obviously, this would be a logical choice for someone who actually
> *had* no preference between the other two candidates after indicating
> his first choice.

Right. And it would just increase the noise in the system to give
members an incentive, in the form of having their ballots counted
instead of being thrown out, to randomly choose one or the other of
the additional candidates.

> Two other members made it known to the Editor by e-mail that they
> would *not* be voting preferentially.

They were probably worried that someone would tell them they had to
in order for their votes to be counted--but so far no one is advocating
this.

> Since members are free not to indicate their choices beyond their
> first choice -- and the Constitution does not say that they are *not*
> -- the election is valid.

As only one voter was unaware of the requirement for preferential
voting and the election for President was decided by two votes, the
election is valid.

> If members were not free to do this, such a restriction would have
> to be made explicit in the Constitution, together with a provision for
> ballots being ruled invalid if they do not have the minimum number
> of choices appropriately marked. Imposing such a requirement in
> the absence of its being mandated by the Constitution would amount
> to an unjustified curtailment of member rights.

> Finally, *requiring* second and third place preferences is similar to
> requiring that there be no abstentions for various positions, and
> abstentions have always been allowed in Prometheus elections.

> Fred Britton, Treasurer.

I agree with the above assessment.


Kevin Langdon

Date: Tue, 16 Feb 1999 12:09:53 -0800
To: Prometheus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Internet Officer & Electronic Voting

At 05:14 AM 2/16/99 +0200, Kerry Williams wrote:

> At 07:54 PM 2/15/99 -0800, [Kevin Langdon] wrote:

>> At 07:37 PM 2/15/99 +0200, Steve Schuessler wrote:

>>> [Kevin Langdon] wrote:

>>>> I don't think this scheme can be simplified keeping all the constraints
>>>> intact, but there are other ways to do it by going outside of the box.
>>>> Fred Britton mentioned one of them: having an electronic system
>>>> validate the ballots. Another approach would be to do away wtih the
>>>> secret ballot. Why shouldn't members stand up and be counted?

>>> Voting via secret ballot is a cornerstone of the democratic process.

>> It has a place in the *history* of the democratic process, but there is
>> very little danger that members of Prometheus will assault other
>> members whose votes they disagree with, so the compelling reason
>> that led to the secret ballot doesn't apply here.

> I am not quite so optimistic. Vituperative verbal bashing, name-calling,
> and taunting insults are not rare even here in the stratosphere. I don't
> believe I need to rattle off specifics, Kevin; both of us have been the
> butt of somebody else's personal attack.

Yes, but we're both still here. Sticks and stones and all that. And sometimes
a personal attack is appropriate:

Hitler, shitler, you're a baby butcher!

Now people tend to get upset when figures like Hitler are used as examples.
But this is a category mistake. Our criminal "justice" system abounds with
examples of petty criminals who victimize real individuals being allowed
to go free because they *aren't* Hitler. Both large offenses and small need
to be taken seriously.

It is frequently the case, in the high-IQ societies, that the officers of the
societies commit grave injustices in the name of the members they
represent (one needs only to think about the ten people who have been
expelled from the ISPE without the opportunity to present a defense and
without a vote of the membership, although the latest one, Paul Maxim,
richly deserved it). If we permit the officers to violate a society's
constitution in small ways (e.g., election timing) or to use their power to
silence their enemies, we are opening the door to more serious abuses
down the line. Strong words are appropriate wherever injustice exists.

>>> It's more complicated, but it's worth it--no member should feel
>>> coerced or pressured. Ever.

>> Why should it make one feel coerced or pressured to publicly state
>> one's position? Legislators seem to survive voting on the record.

> That doesn't apply. I pay legislators' salaries--I expect to see if they
> cave in to the tobacco lobby. No legislator has a right to pry into my
> voting habits: I don't represent them.

Yes, but *that* doesn't apply. We're weighing the pros and cons of
the secret ballot. I mentioned legislators not in the context of whether
members owe each other a *duty* to disclose their votes but of whether
doing so is fatal.

> We may choose to announce our endorsements. You did; fine. I didn't.
> By posting members' votes, a crucial freedom is exenterated--to make
> a difference without personally becoming embroiled in disputatious
> wrangling.

That's a valid consideration, but there's another side to this. There's
a shameful history of moral cowardice, even here in these societies.
None of my colleagues on the Membership Committee spoke up when
Fred Vaughan imposed censorship on the deliberations of the MC and
I wouldn't go along with this violation of the plain language of the
constitution. Do we want to give an incentive to moral cowardice via
our voting method? I would prefer not to.

> If more people vote using the secret ballot, you have my compelling
> reason: more voters => higher representation => a better Society.

Not always. Those who have a rational basis for distinguishing among
candidates running for an office should vote and those who don't
should not vote, to reduce the noise in the system. Sometimes, this is
just a matter of leaving blank the boxes for a particular office, but
there are some people who see that there are differences and that
others are talking about those differences but really feel that they don't
really understand the situation well enough to cast an informed ballot.
Better for them not to vote at all.

Please note that the entirety of the previous paragraph simply defines
an exception to Steve's remark to which it responds.

To get back to Steve's point, I'm not sure that his "equation" (hey,
they call things that look like that equations in chemistry) is correct.
If an election were like what's called a "round robin" (a form used
in meetings I've attended in which a question or topic is selected
and each person makes a short response to it, with no interruptions
permitted until the last person has spoken) and each member's votes
and commentaries were printed in the issue following the election,
it seems likely that people would begin to take a strong interest in
participation because they're fascinated by the result--the opportunity
for a detailed look at how the voters see the issues as they come up.
Indeed, it's the reluctance of the membership to pay attention to
what's going on in the organization that permits all the mischief to
happen in the first place.

There are people who complain about the increases in the cost of
health care as a proportion of income. These people are not taking
into account the fact that medical science has made available highly
effective methods for preserving health that were not available
before *and it's not reasonable to expect them not to cost something*.
And those who complain about the burdensomeness of taking part in
the affairs of a society wish for somebody else to carry the burden
for them. Time and again, this leads to abuses by those intent on
using their power to establish dominance over others. People are
really being hurt in these battles; members have a duty to make sure
that those who wind up on the short end are those making the
trouble and not those who oppose them.

It must be clearly understood that trouble is not always equally
visible to all where it springs up, which often leads to a "kill-the-
messenger" reaction; those who speak up are taken for the
troublemakers. Not everyone notices when there is a small erosion
of liberty but inattention to this erosion is dangerous. One might
wake up one day in a concentration camp.

Having said all that, I wish to note that I'm just defending the
*reasonableness* of abolishing the secret ballot, which came up
in the context of ways to simplify election procedures, and I'm not
saying that I will be unhappy if the membership chooses to keep
it. I'm saying that he secret ballot is sometimes a useful tool and
sometimes not (e.g., in the case of legislators mentioned above),
and not an icon to be defended like motherhood and apple pie.

Abolishing the secret ballot came up in the context of double-
blind election procedures. Although I appreciate Guy's scheme,
I'm inclined to favor Fred Britton's suggestion that software for
recording votes on the Prometheus Web site be developed.

> **How many of you would like me to dredge up your votes for
> Richard M. Nixon?

Nixon was not a nice man in a number of ways, but he wasn't all that
bad as President, when you look at his record as a whole. (However,
in retrospect, his approach to China has led to all sorts of problems.
We should not be courting the largest of the remaining Evil Empires
the way we are.)

>>>> In any case, we need to get the Editor and the Treasurer out of the
>>>> loop. Whenever either of these officers is standing for reelection
>>>> or running for another office, there's a conflict of interest. We
>>>> should have an elections officer (or officers, one in place of the
>>>> Editor and another of the Treasurer in the above scheme), as is
>>>> the case in TNS.

>>> To avoid a recursive 'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?' antinomy,
>>> a line of trust must be drawn somewhere. We trust our Treasurer
>>> with our money, and our Editor with our writings.

>> The fact that a line must be drawn somewhere is not a reason to just
>> let it remain where it's been in the past without critical examination
>> of the question of optimal placement of that line. We have no choice
>> but to trust somebody with the money and someone with making
>> editorial decisions, but it is possible to avoid conflict-of-interest
>> situations by simply entrusting the ballot-handling function to
>> people who aren't running for office. Where's the down side to this?

> I agree it would be better to give the ballot-handling to an unperturbable
> entity, but I am not yet ready to de-loop humans (Colossus to Guardian,
> anyone?).

We're not talking humans here we're talking positions, which are filled
by a progression of humans. Trustworthiness is distributed in a bell
curve, more or less, and we must anticipate that someone one or two
standard deviations below the mean may not be completely scrupulous
in handling elections; we will get such a person 16% or 2.3% of the
time. Furthermore, the avoidance of conflicts of interest is an important
principle of democratic government.

> Sometimes officers opt out of seeking reelection amidst personal
> disputes or for health reasons; neither is ideal for our purposes.

What do you mean by "health reasons"? If you're talking about stress
brought on by society business, well, if you can't stand the heat...

But this is irrelevant to the question of whether officers who are
running in an election should count the ballots for that election. This
is, at least, contrary to the usual practice in membership associations.

> So we are still saddled with the problem of selection. How are we to
> elect an Election Officer who may not run for office? Appointment
> can't avoid the possibility of collusion, n'est pas? Finally, how can
> you evaluate someone's integrity who has not demonstrated it publicly?

The officers select an Elections Officer before the election, when things
are relatively calm. Sure, there could be "collusion" or election tampering,
but it's *less likely*.

> Occam's Razor to the rescue: we elect those we trust the most. Let
> them count ballots.

> Steve Schuessler

Occam, boy, you put that thing away before you cut somebody with it!

Think about *what* you're trusting somebody with. Trustworthiness is
defined in relation to that. Don't let the fox guard the hen house.


Kevin Langdon