Prometheus and Mega Societies, May 1999 (Part Three)
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 19:43:14 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: "Russell F. Vaughan" <fred@vaughan.cc>
cc: WholyOther@aol.com, fire@wwwh.com
Subject: Re: archiving?
[Quoted material moved from end.]
On Fri, 21 May 1999, Russell F. Vaughan wrote:
> M:
>
> WholyOther@aol.com wrote:
> >
> > I don't want my posts archived, it would be inhibiting. Fifi told me to say
> > that.
>
> It seems to me that Fifi's pretty astute for a two-bit whore:)
>
> My uncle used to say, "That's what Agnes told me last night," much to my
> Aunt Betty's chagrin. I thought it was pretty cute, but since my wife's
> middle name is Agnes, it isn't nearly so effective.
>
> However, I like Fifi's advice. I personally wish Chris would make his
> ideas *hardcopy* in GoF when he thinks a concept may have leaked out
> through the wires. That is a media that lends itself more to thoughtful
> meditation and analysis.
>
> We have a nice separation of functionality between our two media. I
> actually like being free to say things without worrying that they might
> be taken out of context years after they were said. And I don't mean I
> want to be able to lie! It's a matter of conversations and essays being
> quite different genre in *every* sense of the word. I think we want as
> much diversity as we can get so that more members will feel free to
> contribute.
>
> Fred V.
Under ordinary circumstances, your advice that I print my work in GoF
would be the ticket. However, as some of you are aware, the Mega Society
now has two journals, and perhaps I'd better explain the reasons for that
before we continue on this track.
First, there's the matter of who "really" edits the journal. I can make a
pretty good case that it's me - in fact, I named it Noesis - but I don't
really expect the WCF (my "opposing faction" in the group) to agree with
me. They call their journal Noesis too, and I call mine Noesis/ECE to
distinguish it as a separate edition as one of the same journal. In fact,
since I publish it free except for voluntary contributions, it's a rather
expensive proposition for me. So the question becomes, why do I do it?
I do it because the editor of the other edition, who was appointed under
suspicious circumstances and probably isn't qualified to be in the Mega
Society at all, some time ago pronounced all my writing "crap!" and vowed
to eliminate all "crap!" from Noesis. In other words, he announced his
intention to censor my contributions, which are so far over his head that
he wouldn't know what they meant if I made him eat them for breakfast,
lunch and dinner. Make no mistake, the CTMU is the best and most coherent
intellectual product ever to emerge from the Mega Society; it's just my
bad luck that the WCF's "editor" doesn't have what it takes to understand
it (since there are now two such editors, I'm afraid I have to point out
that this goes for both of them).
Since then, I've realized that publishing a separate edition of Noesis
gives me a certain advantage, to wit, I don't have to listen to complaints
about a 10- or 12-page article "taking up too much room" in the WCF's
edition, which is generally filled with parliamentary quibbling and pure
nonsense anyway (those of you who receive it know what I mean, and if you
don't, then we disagree on what does and doesn't constitute nonsense,
which in itself is a reason for two editions).
For example, Noesis/ECE 140 contained a 30-page exposition of the CTMU,
and the current edition (142) has a fifteen-pager...and I didn't have to
endure any squawking, accusations of crankery, etc., from the usual
underqualified pissants. This is good for both me and the Mega Society, of
whose combined membership the CTMU is probably the most coherent
intellectual product (in fact, there isn't even a close second, although
a couple of people - e.g., Mike Price and Robert Low - have occasionally
contributed some worthwhile things).
But let's return, for a moment, to the time when I was probably the most
productive contributor to the single edition. Whenever I'd publish an
article about the CTMU, I'd hope that it would be the start of a
meaningful dialogue. Instead, six months after it had appeared with a
snide remark or two from the self-appointed editor and/or publisher,
somebody might respond in a way that typically had nothing to do with what
I'd written. The next issue would then contain a yappy complaint, complete
with an accusation of "crankery", from some idiot. I'd respond, usually
with a new piece of math or logic. And then the whole glacial process
would repeat itself. This went on for a fruitless *decade*.
Obviously, there was no way to develop a consensus under these
circumstances. But I continued in order to establish priority for
my results...until it dawned on me that neither the publisher nor the
"membership officer" would return a phone call or even respond to a
friendly letter from me! I then realized that if said publisher were ever
queried over the issue of priority over the CTMU, he probably wouldn't
respond to the query. He might say "Chris who?". But as soon as he found
out that it was about "the wrong Chris", he probably couldn't be trusted
to recognize my name.
I later joined TNS, only to learn that the journal had unrealistic
length restrictions on member contributions (I believe the limit was
2 pages per contributor a year or so ago, at least according to
something I read in Vidya). I might sometimes be able to trim the length
of my contributions to under ten pages, but I sure as hell can't trim them
to two! (It seems the restriction existed because political infighting was
generating long, outraged screeds from certain offended parties.)
What, if I may ask, are the restrictions on contributions to Gift
of Fire? And what does it mean that the GoF "owns the copyright" to
published material?
Chris L.
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 19:50:55 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: Heather <hlp@alum.mit.edu>
cc: GoF General Email <fire@wwwh.com>
Subject: Re: I "gotta" ask
On Fri, 21 May 1999, Heather wrote:
> Chris! WHAT line of work are you IN???
>
A little a this, a little a that. If you were from NY, you'd know exactly
what that means.
Seriously, ever since my brief and abortive college career, I've been
spending my weekends tossing people out of bars. Ever see the movie
"Roadhouse"? Sort of like that, only Patrick Swayze would literally have
been killed the first day he walked into a "bad place". Nice abs, but no
matter how well you can street fight, you need mass and strength to
deliver the required impact (the laws of physics again). In fact, the
object is really to solve the problem while avoiding any impact at all;
nonballistic maneuvers are greatly preferred due to the ever-present
spectre of litigation. But that requires even more strength than hitting
and kicking people, which I usually prefer not to do anyhow (if I myself
get hit - and no one has ever escaped dire consequencess for doing that -
then all bets are off). Whenever possible, I talk nicely and get the
person or people to leave of their own free will.
In this line of work, I'm a shrimp at six feet and 250 pounds. You get a
lot of college athletes, professional wrestlers, martial arts competitors
and moonlighting cops. When I have to hire a crew, I avoid the martial
artists (too ballistic) and forbid the cops to wear their shootin' irons
on the job. It's always a bad move to have a gun in a nightclub...you can
get buried, disarmed and shot. In the 80's, the Brooklyn boys who
frequented my places of employment were merely into rioting. Now most of
the business comes from teenegers who go to alchohol-free clubs in
stocking caps and baggy jeans carrying knives, boxcutters and single-edged
razor blades (the metal detectors usually miss them). Regardless of ethnic
background, they listen to rap music and try to sound as "rappy" as
possible (even the less violent ones are magnetized by the culture). This
speaks volumes to me about the origins of all that youth violence out
there.
I don't like bars and I hate the work - you better believe I mean it! -
but I need the money and I'm widely enough known in the field to be in
demand under certain (adverse) circumstances.
I do other things as well, but there's no reason to talk about that...
Chris
Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 21:19:50 -0700
To: Prometheus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Langdon, Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy videos
At 11:44 PM 5/22/99 EDT, Michael Corrado wrote:
> Click here (no not there, you idiot) to see the latest in hardcore
> internet adult action. Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy, and newcomer
> Kevin Langdon tangle in an all out web fest of unbridled thought
> experiment. Who can girdle Goedel before the mud dries and the
> bras come off? This is not a Turing test!! So if you like your action
> hot and thoughty, don't think twice about joining the excitement at
> www.completeTHIS.com. It will be a moist slippery stack of
> pancakes like you have never seen!
> Next month, Ada Countess of Lovelace vs. Kevin Langdon in The
> Milk of Human Computing. You won't want to miss that one, folks!!!
This is offensive.
Kevin Langdon
Date: Sun, 23 May 1999 00:12:28 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: WholyOther@aol.com
cc: fire@wwwh.com
Subject: Re: Langdon, Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy videos
On Sat, 22 May 1999 WholyOther@aol.com wrote:
> Click here (no not there, you idiot) to see the latest in hardcore internet
> adult action. Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy, and newcomer Kevin Langdon tangle
> in an all out web fest of unbridled thought experiment. Who can girdle Goedel
> before the mud dries and the bras come off? This is not a Turing test!! So if
> you like your action hot and thoughty, don't think twice about joining the
> excitement at www.completeTHIS.com. It will be a moist slippery stack of
> pancakes like you have never seen!
>
> Next month, Ada Countess of Lovelace vs. Kevin Langdon in The Milk of Human
> Computing. You won't want to miss that one, folks!!!
>
That's right, folks. If you doubt that Kevin is taking an unprecedented
walk on the wild side, enter his name into a major search engine and see
what you get. I tried it once to see if I could come up with a web site or
email address, and discovered an unsuspected double life...
Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 00:37:11 -0700
To: Prometheus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Langdon, Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy videos
At 12:17 AM 5/24/99 -0400, Chris Langan wrote:
> On Sun, 23 May 1999 WholyOther@aol.com wrote:
>> I think the public deserves to know the truth about Kevin
>> Langdon and those wenches I have seen him manhandling.
>> He finds this offensive, the cajolery, but someone must
>> stand up and take the heat for justice and the American
>> way. Kevin Langdon is a grown up (vis the mud wrestling
>> videos) and should bear scrutiny with courage. That's why
>> I hired the private investigator.
This is, of course, *not* offensive, but amusing.
>> As for Chris Langan, I would pay to see that pencil neck
>> tangle with Hillary Clinton, Barbara Bush, and Nancy
>> Reagan in the jello pit. I would sing the National Anthem
>> every time a bra came off. Even when Chris's bra came off.
>> Even I would wear a bra to see that spectacle. Bread and
>> circuses and bras, man.
>>
>> I am pretty sure the rest of you know what I am talking about.
>>
>> As for me, I am going to go back to my quilting.
> Now, if there were any substance to the second paragraph, I'd
> be strongly tempted to grab my spurs and my Crisco and head
> on over to (?) Michael Corrado's place to discuss my "pencil
> neck".
Even in jest, such threats are in very poor taste.
> By the way, have you heard about the party in Michael's
> mouth? Everyone's coming!
This, also, is highly offensive.
Kevin Langdon
From: Genie313@aol.com
Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 13:03:24 EDT
To: theft_of_fire@egroups.com
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Langdon, Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy videos
In a message dated 5/24/99 3:39:09 AM EDT, kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com
writes:
Chris Langan wrote:
> > By the way, have you heard about the party in Michael's
> > mouth? Everyone's coming!
With a tongue like his, he must be an incredible lover! You guys should ask
him for some pointers:)
Gina
Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 14:30:21 -0700
To: Prometheus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Langdon, Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy videos
At 01:03 PM 5/24/99 EDT, Gina wrote:
> In a message dated 5/24/99 3:39:09 AM EDT,
> kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com writes:
>> Chris Langan wrote:
>>> By the way, have you heard about the party in Michael's
>>> mouth? Everyone's coming!
Don't drag me into this. I objected to it.
> With a tongue like his, he must be an incredible lover! You
> guys should ask him for some pointers:)
> Gina
This is also offensive. These sorts of remarks are detrimental
to the atmosphere here.
Kevin Langdon
Date: Tue, 25 May 1999 14:55:49 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: "Gerald J. Walsh 8-286-6538" <walshgj@dps-server.pgh.wec.com>
cc: fire@wwwh.com
Subject: Re: Langdon, Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy videos
[Quoted material moved from end.]
On Mon, 24 May 1999, Gerald J. Walsh 8-286-6538 wrote:
> > Date: Sun, 23 May 1999 00:12:28 -0400 (EDT)
> > From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
> > To: WholyOther@aol.com
> > Subject: Re: Langdon, Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy videos
> >
> > On Sat, 22 May 1999 WholyOther@aol.com wrote:
> >
> > > Click here (no not there, you idiot) to see the latest in hardcore internet
> > > adult action. Pamela Lee, Jenny McCarthy, and newcomer Kevin Langdon tangle
> > > in an all out web fest of unbridled thought experiment. Who can girdle
Goedel
> > > before the mud dries and the bras come off? This is not a Turing test!! So
if
> > > you like your action hot and thoughty, don't think twice about joining the
> > > excitement at www.completeTHIS.com. It will be a moist slippery stack of
> > > pancakes like you have never seen!
> > >
> > > Next month, Ada Countess of Lovelace vs. Kevin Langdon in The Milk of Human
> > > Computing. You won't want to miss that one, folks!!!
> > >
> > That's right, folks. If you doubt that Kevin is taking an unprecedented
> > walk on the wild side, enter his name into a major search engine and see
> > what you get. I tried it once to see if I could come up with a web site or
> > email address, and discovered an unsuspected double life...
> >
> I'd be glad to look it up, but according to an article in my local paper,
> Gerald Walsh was shot and killed when he was robbed in Paoli a number of
> years ago, so I really shouldn't be answering this. (Why do I always seem
> to be the last to find out about these things?)
>
> Jerry
Hey, let's not be missing the point here. For obvious reasons, porn stars
hardly ever use their own names (I understand there are some exceptions,
but most of them don't want Mom, Dad and Aunt Agnes in Peoria to know
that they've made it big by peddling sin). So this particular actor
probably chose a stage name. Now, why would he choose the stage name
"Kevin Langdon", unless it's because he knows something of his namesake?
(I stop short of pointing out that he lives by the dick.)
Just pointing something out. I hereby disavow this remark.
Date: Sun, 23 May 1999 23:26:25 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: Fredrik Ullén <Fredrik.Ullen@neuro.ki.se>
cc: fire@wwwh.com
Subject: Re: CTMU - MAP
First, since my request for an archivist is not being granted, I reserve
the right to terminate a particular explanation at any point for
proprietary reasons. My interlocutor does not have the right, at that
point, to form negative judgments based on this restriction. As soon as I
find that this ground rule is being violated, the discussion will
terminate altogether.
On Mon, 24 May 1999, Fredrik [iso-8859-1] Ullén wrote:
> Chris,
>
> I now have some questions regarding the MAP principle of the CTMU.
> I start with quoting the summary section on MAP from the first paper you
> sent me:
>
> >1. MAP (Metaphysical Autology Principle): MAP is simply a containment
> >principle for deep reality which states that reality itself, defined as a
> >universally-quantified logical relation based on physical interaction, must
> >comprise the final answer for any question posed about reality. I.e.,
> >because reality is self-contained, there is no outside vantage - no outside
> >realm of causation or explanation - from which it can be analyzed. So on
> >its deepest level, reality is self-analytic. [Note that we have just
> >made something complex look simple; you have to know some relatively
> >unfamiliar math to work with the MAP.]
>
> I will start with one general question and then ask for some specific
> clarifications to the above text.
>
> The MAP - as far as I understand it - seems closely related to one of the
> age-old metaphysical conundrums you claim to have shed light on, namely the
> "superultimate question" or what you call the paradox of ex nihilo
> cosmogony: why does anything at all exist rather than the other way around,
> and how did something come to exist out of nothing?
>
> You boldly claim that the universe is "self-contained" with regard to
"why?"
> questions regarding its nature and in the same passage state that "in order
> to achieve existence, a universe must internally generate the means of its
> self-selection from unbound infocognitive potential". Three
> questions in response to all this:
>
> (i) How can the universe internally generate the means of its self-selection
> before existing?
Spacetime must be logically redefined to permit global parallelism. Once
parallelism is established, the universe can be regarded as the product
of internal feedback (within an unbounded realm of infocognitive
potential). A concise explanation is contained in the second article you
were sent. Look for mention of NeST, the computational model of cosmic
parallelism, and for the simple mathematical equations describing cosmic
"expansion" (actually, conspansion).
> (ii) Why is there infocognitive potential to begin with? I should confess
> straight away that I ask this question without a clear grasp of what you
> mean by "infocognitive potential". The predicate "infocognitive"
clearly
> refers to your view of spatial structures as information and physical
> processes as forms of cognition, but in this case mere talking of
> "infocognitive *potential*" seems just like a more idiosyncratic way
> of formulating the same old paradox, not like an explanation. The closest
> I come to a discussion of why you think such a potential is a necessity is
> the claim that "nothing and something, or absence and presence are logical
> complements that cancel to something more like unlimited informational
> potential". Could you possibly elaborate a bit on this last sentence?
Let's analyse your question: "why is there infocognitive potential to
begin with?" Suppose there were not. Then the existence of this universe,
which is given by perception, cannot be generalized to potential
existence. But potential existence is what results when we suspend the
constraints defining actual existence; without it, all we have are the
constraints themselves. But then the constraints are either self-defining
or they have no explanation at all. Since the latter condition precludes
(scientific, philosophical, or even cognitive) analysis, the analytical
imperative requires its immediate rejection. On the other hand, the
former condition can itself be regarded as an actualization of potential.
So the very analysis of reality implies that reality is self-refining
within a realm of existential (infocognitive) potential.
> (iii) Even if there was infocognitive potential to begin with, why didn't
> it remain just a potential?
This question is meaningless. First, the potential whose existence we have
just established obviously did not "remain just a potential"; we are even
now perceiving an actual reality that has been refined from it. Somewhat
equivalently, "didn't" is the past tense of "doesn't", and temporal
distinctions cannot be defined until time actually exists. So by the
mere ability to ask such a question, we know that temporal potential *is*
refined to time as we know it. Furthermore, because reality is
self-creating, it must effect the refinement.
> Ok, now for some details:
>
> >1. MAP (Metaphysical Autology Principle): MAP is simply a containment
> principle for deep reality...
>
> What more precisely does "deep" mean here?
Some people naively define "reality" as the physical universe, which is
that part of the universe governed by the "laws of physics" and
accessible to the scientific method. But the laws of physics are a subset
of mathematical reality, and (moreover) require an explanation for their
own selective actualization. "Deep reality" is consists of all that is
relevant to this requirement.
> >... which states that reality itself, defined as...
> Shouldn't it be "viewed as" or "regarded as"?
If one objects to the seeming arbitrariness of "defined", one might better
say "veridically described". That is, there's only one way to describe
reality at the given level of generality.
> >a universally-quantified logical relation based on physical
> >interaction, must comprise the final answer for any
> >question posed about reality.
>
> A naive remark: It simply doesn't seem to be the case that reality itself
> *comprises* the answer to any question about it.
Then suppose that reality does not comprise the answer to any question
about it. Now, if such a question is meaningful - i.e., if it is not a
waste of time to ask it - then it has a real answer. But if the answer is
real, then it is by definition contained in reality (which describes all
that is real). And if it is contained in reality, then reality is obviously what
comprises it. In other words, MAP follows directly from the meaning of
"reality".
> > [Note that we have just made something complex look simple; you
> > have to know some relatively unfamiliar math to work with the MAP.]
>
> I think a more technical description of the MAP, where the relevant
> math is discussed in detail - preferably with concrete examples - would be
> necessary. Do you have such a text already or is it in preparation?
Yes, I have a more technical description. However, I'm always adding new
insight to such descriptions as the CTMU evolves (which it is designed to
do). Read the brief algebraic description included in the second piece;
that's technical enough for present purposes.
Best wishes,
Chris
Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 01:45:42 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: Fredrik Ullén <Fredrik.Ullen@neuro.ki.se>
cc: fire@wwwh.com
Subject: Re: CTMU - MAP
Perhaps I'd better be slightly more specific regarding the following.
Fredrik wrote,
> (ii) Why is there infocognitive potential to begin with?
This part has already been answerd.
> I should confess straight away that I ask this question without a
> clear grasp of what you mean by "infocognitive potential".
This is what you get when you suspend the semantic constraints defining
"infocognition", which is just the monic substance that results when the
Cartesian (mind|matter) barrier is removed.
> The predicate "infocognitive" clearly
> refers to your view of spatial structures as information and physical
> processes as forms of cognition, but in this case mere talking of
> "infocognitive *potential*" seems just like a more idiosyncratic way of
> formulating the same old paradox, not like an explanation.
No. Actualized infocognitive reality isn't a terminal concept, but
infocognitive potential *is*.
That is, when we suspend the semantic constraints defining infocognitive
reality, we arrive at infocognitive potential. But at this point, there
are no more constraints to suspend. Pure IC potential, the technical term
for which is "unbound telesis" (UBT), is simply the total absence of
constraint. Logically, it is even more primitive than "nothingness", the
basis of traditional ex nihilo cosmology. That is, when we suspend the
semantic constraint defining nothingness - i.e., when we suspend the
constraint "absence of anything" - we again arrive at unbound telesis.
Semantically, it's the end of the line...and it's NOT "nothing".
In other words, the ex nihilo paradox is based on a logical error,
specifically one of semantics. To wit, the term "nothing" is actually
defined as one reland of a logical relation involving both nothing and
something, and this relation reduces to a yet more primitive concept,
unbound telesis. It may violate your intuition, but that's logic.
> The closest I come to a discussion of why you think such a potential is
> a necessity is the claim that "nothing and something, or absence and
> presence are logical complements that cancel to something more like
> unlimited informational potential". Could you possibly elaborate a bit
> on this last sentence?
I just did. "Something more like unlimited informational potential"
refers to pure infocognitive potential or UBT. When UBT is restricted by
the constraint associated with the semantic relation "nothing equals
not-something", the (recursively-defined) terms "nothing" and
"something"
result...but only as secondary concepts. Logically speaking, the ultimate
reality - the eternal sea in which the universe arises through internal
self-amplification - is a blend of both.
I reiterate...I'm writing a book on this. I have a lot of work invested,
and I'm not about to give somebody the chance to run off to The Journal of
Consciousness Studies and play the genius at my expense. The people on
this list are evidently willing to put up with the shallowness of an
unarchived list as long as they can read about Hillary Clinton, Nancy
Reagan, etc. tearing each other's bras off, and so on. That's fine, and I
respect their right to make that intellectual decision for themselves. But
I too have my priorities, and they lie elsewhere than talking about
Hillary's underwear.
On the other hand, neither do I propose to answer the same circular
objections, rephrased and reprinted in the journal month after month, for
the same number of years I did in the Mega Society. It led to nothing
there, and for all I know, we may have a similar cast of players here.
The bottom line is that for maximum achievement, there should really be a
way to have accelerated dialogues about serious, high-stakes issues.
But I'm only a newcomer, and for all I know, this may not be a
maximum-achievement society (even by aspiration).
In any event, I hope this helps.
Chris
Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 16:51:54 -0400 (EDT)
From: Langan <clangan@suffolk.lib.ny.us>
To: Fredrik Ullén <Fredrik.Ullen@neuro.ki.se>
cc: fire@wwwh.com
Subject: Re: CTMU - MAP
On Mon, 24 May 1999, Fredrik [iso-8859-1] Ullén wrote:
> At 23:26 1999-05-23 -0400, Langan wrote:
> >First, since my request for an archivist is not being granted, I reserve
> >the right to terminate a particular explanation at any point for
> >proprietary reasons. My interlocutor does not have the right, at that
> >point, to form negative judgments based on this restriction. As soon as I
> >find that this ground rule is being violated, the discussion will
> >terminate altogether.
>
> Anyone on this list has the right to terminate his own participation
> in any discussion for any reason, naturally :). However, I'm afraid
> you have to accept that people also have the obvious right to form
> judgements freely. But I don't think you seriously mean that this violates
> any "ground rule" of yours.
What I'm talking about is the established tendency of certain participants
in these forums to pass judgments before all the facts are in. Such people
are a waste of my time, and insofar as their judgments are usually
misleading, worse than a waste of everyone else's.
> ...
> >Let's analyse your question: "why is there infocognitive potential to
> >begin with?" Suppose there were not. Then the existence of this universe,
> >which is given by perception, cannot be generalized to potential
> >existence. But potential existence is what results when we suspend the
> >constraints defining actual existence; without it, all we have are the
> >constraints themselves. But then the constraints are either self-defining
> >or they have no explanation at all. Since the latter condition precludes
> >(scientific, philosophical, or even cognitive) analysis, the analytical
> >imperative requires its immediate rejection. On the other hand, the
> >former condition can itself be regarded as an actualization of potential.
> >So the very analysis of reality implies that reality is self-refining
> >within a realm of existential (infocognitive) potential.
>
> Here too (see previous posting) I think a more careful discussion
> of what you exactly mean as semantic constraints would be crucial.
A constraint restricts a range of freedom or ambiguity, in this case
regarding the meaning of a term. That is, a semantic constraint is a piece
of information that restricts the meaning, or reduces the ambiguity, of
another piece of information. Definitions consist of semantic constraints
(overlaid on syntactic constraints). If you require more than this, I'm
afraid you'll have to be more specific.
> >> (iii) Even if there was infocognitive potential to begin with, why didn't
> >> it remain just a potential?
> >
> >This question is meaningless. First, the potential whose existence we have
> >just established obviously did not "remain just a potential"; we are
even
> >now perceiving an actual reality that has been refined from it. Somewhat
> >equivalently, "didn't" is the past tense of "doesn't", and
temporal
> >distinctions cannot be defined until time actually exists. So by the
> >mere ability to ask such a question, we know that temporal potential *is*
> >refined to time as we know it. Furthermore, because reality is
> >self-creating, it must effect the refinement.
>
> My question was prompted by your claim that reality is self-contained
> with respect to "why?"-questions. There seems to be a misunderstanding
> here, though: I'm certainly not questioning that there's a universe
> out there, I'm only asking "why?". Let me rephrase my question
> to avoid the temporal dilemma: why is there a reality rather than
> only infocognitive potential?
Becuase infocognitive potential, being free of infocognitive constraint,
contains all possible infocognitive forms, and some of these forms are
self-amplifying through temporal feedback as described in the second
article I sent you. The universe is like a seed crystal in a supercritical
fluid, where crystallization is logically endomorphic to the seed.
> > ...
> >> What more precisely does "deep" mean here?
> >
> >Some people naively define "reality" as the physical universe, which is
> >that part of the universe governed by the "laws of physics" and
> >accessible to the scientific method. But the laws of physics are a subset
> >of mathematical reality, and (moreover) require an explanation for their
> >own selective actualization. "Deep reality" is consists of all that is
> >relevant to this requirement.
>
> Ok. I don't say I have a crystal-clear view of your ontology from this, but
> we can leave that for the moment.
>
> >> >... which states that reality itself, defined as...
> >
> >> Shouldn't it be "viewed as" or "regarded as"?
> >
> >If one objects to the seeming arbitrariness of "defined", one might
better
> >say "veridically described".
>
> I like that more. It was a minor point, though.
>
> >Then suppose that reality does not comprise the answer to any question
> >about it. Now, if such a question is meaningful - i.e., if it is not a
> >waste of time to ask it - then it has a real answer. But if the answer is
> >real, then it is by definition contained in reality (which describes all
> >that is real). And if it is contained in reality, then reality is
> >obviously what comprises it. In other words, MAP follows directly from
> >the meaning of "reality".
>
> I'm afraid you are begging the question. If you define meaningful questions
> as questions that have "real" answers, where real is taken to mean
> "contained in reality", then MAP is reduced to an uninteresting
> tautology. (Please note that this is a much more specific objection
> that Criticism 3 in your "Reality Check...").
I'm afraid I'm not begging the question. Reality has been defined as a
relation based on relevance to experience and observation. So if a
question lacks a real answer, it is by definition irrelevant to experience
or observation and might as well be ignored. Some things are functions of
the definitions of the terms we use. Some of these definitions, like that
of reality, are necessarily tautological. If you deny this (necessity as
a) possibility, then you're guilty of imposing your own semantic prejudice
on reality. In this case, such a prejudice is not only unsubstantiated,
it's illogical (regardless of what Karl Popper might say to the contrary).
> In general I think it would be a remarkable achievement if you could
> demonstrate by mere conceptual analysis that all meaningful "why?"
> questions necessarily have an answer. I still need some more explanations
> (see my other questions) and probably also more details before I can
> evaluate your effort. Meanwhile my own belief is still that something like
> this cannot be done, that there is nothing in our conception of reality that
> per se prevents us from asking interesting but unanswerable questions
> about its nature.
I'm not trying to rob your life of mystery. Some relevant questions are
indeed unanswerable, but only because the answers are in the process of
being created. If a question neither has an answer nor is in the process
of being answered, then it's a meaningless question, and a logical basis
cannot claimed for it (this happens to be logically demonstrable). The
CTMU is formulated at a stage of logic prior to the latter kind of
question, and you *do* have enough material there to see it.
By the way, philsophy and science are meaningful only insofar as they
couple to logic. Decouple them from logic at any point - make them matters
of belief rather than inference - and it becomes useless to even attempt a
logical discussion. I hope you acknowledge this when referring to your
personal beliefs on such matters.
Chris
Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 00:22:16 -0700
To: Prometheus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Intelligence & thinking
At 04:44 PM 5/14/99 -0400, responding to David Slater, Chris Langan
wrote:
> The distinction between intelligence and power is also problematic. The
> reason: what David calls "power", or that which enables a mind to think
> clearly and effectively to effect desired change in the environment, can
> be posed as a problem (what it is and how to do it), and the problem
> can, by the definition of intelligence as problem-solving ability, be solved
> using intelligence. This higher level of intelligence relates to ordinary
> intelligence as a metalanguage relates to a language, i.e., in such a way
> as to unbind mental (and experiential) syntax and its real-world
> interpretation so that they can be "transcendentally" optimized.
> If the mind is deterministic, then so is intelligence, and so is
"power".
> So any effective scheme to rise above experiential topography also has a
> deterministic implementation. Such a scheme is informational, and the
> information can be learned. It would follow that intelligence, like
> experience and learning, can be acquired...i.e., that people can "learn to
> be more intelligent", provided that they possess a critical threshold of
> efficiency in certain neural parameters.
I think this is true, but the threshold is very high.
> In addition to the basic transmissive and switching parameters known as
> "g", these parameters would include the learning function...the function
> by which a neural network weights its own connections according to a
> combination of existing structure and input. Neurologically, the
> efficiency of this function would constitute a "higher level of g", call
> it g', that depends on g and therefore cannot be factor-analytically
> distinguished from g itself. This {g,g'} complex can itself yield a
> yet-higher order of efficiency g'', and so on for higher-order complexes
> {g,g',g''},..., the nested (convergent) sequence constituting an
> intellectual "self-optimization faculty". Higher orders of intelligence
> may account (at least in part) for the relative deficiencies sometimes
> found to exist in correlations between standard IQ test data and data
> from power IEQ tests, which may involve the modification of neural
> connections over time.
> This idea, which is original as formulated, was previously introduced on
> MegaList.
> Chris Langan
What Chris doesn't seem to be taking into account is that *g* is a variable.
A "different level of *g*" is still *g*. There are, however, emergent
properties of higher levels of *g*.
I agree, in a more limited sense, that fluid *g* (which is the same thing
as just plain *g*) is a "higher order" of intelligence than "crystallized
g,"
which is contaminated with learned information and appears to be
greater or lesser according to the similarity of a person's knowledge
store to that of the designer of a test loaded on this factor.
Kevin Langdon
Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 00:22:24 -0700
To: Prometheus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Intelligence & thinking
At 01:19 AM 5/16/99 +0100, Paul Johns wrote:
> It seems to me that super-high intelligence is of relatively minor
> importance to super-high achievement. It is not even clear that
> many of our famous geniuses did have such very high IQ scores.
Scores, possibly, but examination of their writings proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that these guys had very high IQ's.
> For instance, David Slater mentions that Einstein had an estimated
> IQ of 200+, but I seem to remember that his actual test score was
> closer to IQ 160.
He may have taken more than one test. But any test that didn't put
him at the top of the heap is clearly badly flawed.
> I'm not 100% certain about this, though I do remember clearly
> that Feynman's IQ was only 125.
Then the cutoff for Prometheus is 120.
> I've read quite a lot of exaggerated claims on the IQ scores of
> various geniuses. In a book about Stephen Hawking, for
> example, it was explained that he fell downstairs as a student
> - an early sign of his motor neuron disease - and subsequently
> took the Mensa IQ test to determine if there was any brain
> damage. His score was reported at IQ 250, although it is clear
> that no adult IQ test could have had such a high ceiling. [British
> Mensa are currently using the Cattell IIIB: with a 24-scale and
> IQ 178 maximum (that's an IQ of 152 on a 16-scale) and I
> suspect that is the test that Hawking took.]
It's a good example. It's hard to argue that even Stephen Hawking
could score above the ceiling. But stories about geniuses' *low*
scores should be subjected to the same critical scrutiny.
> I recognise that people have various biological limitations and
> genetic potentials and also that some minimum level of intelligence
> must be required for the super-high achievements of geniuses such
> as Einstein and Feynman.
At least four-sigma level intelligence seems to be required for truly
original work in advanced scientific and technical specialities.
> However, I feel that obsessive dedication, genuine love of the
> subject and really hard work are probably the most important
> factors in achieving brilliance.
When a factor is essential, it cannot be said to be less important
than another factor, but I agree that these other qualities are also
essential.
> "A man does not learn to understand anything unless he loves it"
> Gothe
> "Genius is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent
> perspiration."
> Edison
> BTW: I agree completely with the comments on powerful
> thinking and intelligence - that a high IQ does not guarantee
> clear thinking - and would like to add a reminder that there are
> many more facets to the mind of an excellent thinker than
> intelligence, such as: creativity, motivation, determination,
> knowledge, common sense, humour, wit........ but I won't go
> on.
> It may even be the case that above a certain level of IQ, the
> potential benefits are frequently offset by social and
> psychological difficulties, as suggested by "The Outsiders". This
> could explain why our geniuses do not in fact have the awesome
> IQs that we might expect (e.g. Feynman's modest IQ of 125)
> and why so many super-high IQ's are apparently "wasted". It
> seems likely that an IQ of 150 or 160 would be sufficient to
> succeed in almost any field with hard work and dedication and
> that intelligence levels far above these might merely act as a
> handicap.
That's often the case. There are indications that financial success
and professional status increase uniformly with IQ up to a certain
point (I think it's around 150 or 160) and then decline. (I don't
have a reference handy.)
> With regard to super-high childhood IQ scores [derived from:
> (MA/CA) x 100]: It is clear from Hollingworth's work and the
> work of others that there is a marked "regression to the mean"
> with maturity. It has been suggested that childhood "ratio" scores
> have a natural standard deviation of 24 (cf. the Cattell Scale), so
> it is necessary to multiply the excess above the mean by 2/3rds
> to convert a childhood score to an adult score with the
> conventional SD16.
It's an interesting suggestion, but childhood IQ scores are, in fact,
reasonably normally distributed near the general population mean,
so no linear conversion formula will work.
> Sidis's score, for instance would reduce to a (nontheless very
> impressive) IQ of 200 on an adult, 16-scale score.
> Marilyn vos Savant's score of 218 (at 10 years) would reduce to
> an adult score of IQ 179 [indeed, her score on the Mega Test
> was IQ 186].
> Paul Johns
That was not a correct estimate of her IQ given her raw score on
the Mega and a reasonable statistical treatment of the data. Her
Mega score converts to approximately 175 or 176, the mega level,
which is still not too shabby.
Kevin Langdon
Date: Tue, 25 May 1999 17:37:09 -0700
To: Prometehus <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>
From: Kevin Langdon <kevin.langdon@polymath-systems.com>
Subject: [theft_of_fire] Re: Intelligence & thinking
At 02:58 PM 5/16/99 -0400, Chris Langan wrote:
> On Sun, 16 May 1999, Heather wrote:
>>> BTW: I agree completely with the comments on powerful thinking
>>> and intelligence - that a high IQ does not guarantee clear thinking -
>>> and would like to add a reminder that there are many more facets
>>> to the mind of an excellent thinker than intelligence, such as:
>>> creativity, motivation, determination, knowledge, common sense,
>>> humour, wit........ but I won't go on.
>> If we could just add "compassion" to that, the social IQ would
>> increase dramatically as well. It's not required for someone to think
>> excellently about abstract topics, but it would certainly help when
>> dealing with other people, or topics that are fundamentally social.
>> Which is amusing -- I have always disliked the "squishy" subjects
>> and here I am defending compassion. Probably because it tends to
>> mean the difference between a brilliant person and a great one.
>>
>> Heather
> First, let ne say that as a newcomer, I find the routing here a bit
> more complex than expected.
The routing is about to be simplified.
> For one thing, I've been in TNS for a year, and just now learned
> they had an email list...that interfaces with "fire"through something
> called "groups".
The TNS list has been around for a little less than a year. I'm not sure
how I heard about it, but it's no secret and TNS has an Internet Officer,
Dave Rutherford.
> Next, I'm seeing random second-hand pieces of messages I didn't
> receive first-hand. Anybody want to clue me in on the routing, or
> direct me to a FAQ?
The reason you're not seeing some messages is that you're not on the
Theft of Fire list <theft_of_fire@egroups.com>, which I set up to
counter Fred Vaughan's censorship of the fire list. As the list is now
being managed by Steve Schuessler, who has promised not to censor
it, we are going to make the fire list our main list again, with theft_
of_fire used as a backup in case of technical problems. I have put
your name on the distribution for my messages, which are sent to
theft_of_fire and individuals on the fire list who are not on theft.
> Regarding content, one of my original points was this. As we
> examine progressively higher levels of intelligence - i.e., levels of
> "intelligence applied to itself" - it becomes increasingly hard to
> separate intelligence from other (involved) factors like motivation.
> This is especially obvious with the power IEQ tests, where the
> accurate measurement of higher levels of intelligence depends on
> the presence of sufficient motivation to permit the measurement.
> The bottom line: the higher the ceiling (space and time complexity)
> of any test of problem-solving ability, the more dependent the results
> on the motivation of the subject. So from a factor-analytic standpoint,
> one is no longer dealing with separate factors.
The factors can be separated. Motivation is affected by the reward
received for a given amount of effort expended. Taking a well-designed
test is an enjoyable experience for someone who can do well on it.
There are tests which provide a lot of that kind of reinforcement and
others that are more monotonous; performance by the same subjects
on tests of these different types should shed some light on this question.
> The scheme involving "levels of g" reflects the fact that intelligence
> displays a self-optimization imperative whether associated with mind
> or brain, and that this imperative is goal-directed. Higher levels of g
> reflect the self-optimizative "motivation" of the intellect. This scheme
> was presented in terms of neural structure and functionability to
> emphasize the fact that mind and brain are isomorphic, and that to
> show that whatever we say about intelligence must be expressible in
> neural language.
The self-optimizing function of high levels of *g* may be a factor
contributing to certain anomalies at the high end of the distribution ot
IQ test scores.
Kevin Langdon